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PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE: THE
SHARED AIMS AND OCCASIONAL CONFLICTS OF
LEGITIMACY AND MORAL CREDIBILITY
Josh Bowers"'
Paul H. Rob insun **

INTRODUCTION

A growing literature suggests that a criminal justice system
derives practical value by generating societal perceptions of fair
enforcement and adjudication. 1
Specifically, perceptions of
procedural fairness-resulting in perceptions of the system's
"legitimacy," as the term is used-may promote systemic compliance
with substantive law, cooperation with legal institutions and actors,
and deference to even unfavorable outcomes.2 A separate literature
suggests that a criminal justice system derives practical value by
distributing criminal liability and punishment according to
principles that track societal intuitions of justice.3 Specifically,

*
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1. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDUHAL JUSTICE: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); TOM R. 'I'YLEH, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw
(2006) [hereinafter TYLER, WPOL]; TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE
LAW (2002) [hereinafter TYLER & Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW]; Jonathan D. Casper,
Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 483 (1988); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice
and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Pohcing, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
513 (2003); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule
of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.: REV. RES. 283 [hereinafter Tyler, Effective Rule of
Law]; Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation,
57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) (reviewing the literature on legitimacy); Tom
R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public

Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account
when Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707 (2000); Tom R.
Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHio ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008).
2. See infra Part liLA.
3. See e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW:
WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED How MUCH? 135-212, 231-60 (2008) [hereinafter
ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES]; Laura I. Appleman, Sentencing,
Empirical Desert, and Restorative Justice, in CRIMINAL LAw COl\'VERSATIONS 59
(Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009); Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and
Peculiarly) American "Revolution in Punishment Theory," 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113
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perceptions of substantive ju~:;tice-resulting in perceptions of the
system's "moral credibility"-would seem to promote compliance,
cooperation, and deference. By contrast, a criminal justice system
perceived to be procedurally unfair or substantively unjust may
provoke resistance and subversion, and may lose its capacity to
harness powerful social and normative influence. 4
This Article examines the shared aims and overlaps in
operation and effect of these two criminal justice dynamics-the
"legitimacy" that derives from fair adjudication and professional
enforcement and the "moral credibility" that derives from just
results-as well as the occasional potential for conflict. Specifically,
in this Article, we aim to isolate and define the parameters of each
dynamic, to compare and examine their similarities and differences,
and to explore the settings in which the two run together or (more
rarely) cross-wise. In this way, our overarching objective is to clear
the air. To date, legal scholars have tended to invoke the two
dynamics too casually, to ignore one but not the other, or to conflatc
or confuse the two. Thus, we intend to provide something of a
primer: a useful and necessary analytic framework for ongoing
debates into the advantages, limits, and dangers of moral credibility
and legitimacy. But we do not stop there. We stake out tentative
positions within these debates. That is, we endorse the prevailing
view that moral credibility and legitimacy are promising-indeed,
critical-systemic enterprises, and we make a number of tentative
claims about when and to what degree a system ought to pursue or
prioritize each enterprise. Particularly, we anticipate significant

(2010); Michael T. Cahill, A Fertile Desert?, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS,
supra, at 43; Zachary R. Calo, Empirical Desert and the Moral Economy of
Punishment, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1123 (2010); Adil Ahmad Haque, Legitimacy as
Strategy, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra, at 57; Joseph E. Kennedy,
Empirical Desert and the Endpoints of Punishment, in CRIMINAL LAw
CONVERSATIONS, supra, at 54; Adam Kolber, Compliance-Promoting Intuitions,
in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra, at 41; Youngjae Lee, Desert,
Deontology, and Vengeance, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1141 (2010); Matthew Lister,
Desert: Empirical, Not 1\lletaphysical, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra,
at 51; Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Lay Person
Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839
(2000) [hereinafter Robim;on, Normative Crime Control]; Alice Ristroph, Third
Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151 (2010); Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey
P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1940 (2010); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice:
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007)
[hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice1; Paul H. Robinson & John
M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997) [hereinafter
Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert]; Mary Sigler, The Methodology of Desert,
42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1173 (2010); Christopher Slobogin, Some Hypotheses About
Empirical Desert, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1189 (2010); Andrew E. Tashtz, Empirical
Desert: The Yin and Yang of Criminal Justice, in CRIMINAL LAW CoNVERSATIONS,
supra, at 56.
4. See infra Part III.B.
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crime-control advantages for a system that enjoys perceptions of
both moral credibility and legitimacy, but we conclude that-for
empirical and theoretical reasons-moral credibility ought to be the
principal objective in uncommon circumstances in which a system
may effectively pursue only one.
In Part I, we explore the shared aims of legitimacy and moral
credibility. In Part II, we discuss the practices, procedures, and
rules that produce, undermine, or implicate perceptions of
procedural fairness and substantive justice, and we identify
potential pitfalls and dangers for a criminal justice system
committed to generating perceptions of fairness and justice. In Part
III, we confront the critical question of whether perceptions of
fai1·ness and justice effectively promote deference to law and legal
authorities and institutions. In Part IV, we attempt to explain why
a criminal justice system may come to adopt and implement
practices, standards, and rules that deviate from societal
perceptions of fairness and justice. Finally, in Part V, we examine
the interesting issues raised when legitimacy and moral credibility
conflict with one another, and we sketch our vision for how a system
ought to resolve the tension.
L THE SHARED AIMS OF LEGITIMACY AND MORAL CREDIBILITY
A.

Legitimacy

In law, as in life, legitimacy is a term invoked so casually that it
sometimes seems to signify little more than a vague aspiration.
However, -in the criminal-justice context, the term has come to
represent something more precise.
Criminologists, social
psychologists, and political scientists have refined the concept to
mean a "belief that legal authorities are entitled to be obeyed and
that the individual ought to defer to their judgments."5 In this
Article, we focus principally on the work of Tom Tyler, not because
he is a leading legitimacy theorist and empirical researcher, but
because over the past two decades his work has generated the most
attention in the legal academy, and we are particularly concerned
with the ways in which legal scholars have, to date, used (and
misused) his contributions.
Tyler has argued persuasively that the law's legitimacy (or at
least a perception of it) is critical to a well-functioning criminal
justice system and to public safety more generally. Specifically,
effective crime control depends on volitional deference to substantive
law and to its enforcement and adjudication. And, significantly,
perceptions of procedural fairness may well facilitate such
deference.
The importance of the legitimacy project cannot,
therefore, be oversold. It is a terrifically promising enterprise that

5.

TYLER & HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW,

supra note 1, at xiv.
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may serve to promote the very goals that are (and ought to be)
central to criminal justice: compliance with statutory law and
cooperation with legal authorities and institutions.
Procedure is legitimacy's starting point.6 People come to obey
the law and cooperate with legal authorities because they perceive
their institutions to operate fairly. In this way, perceptions of
procedural fairness facilitate a kind of normative, as opposed to
purely instrumental, crime control.7 Put differently, citizens of a
procedurally just state comport their behavior to the substantive
dictates of the law not because the state exercises coercive power (or,
at least, not exclusively because of it), but because they feel a
normative commitment to the state. Unlike conventional deterrence
theory, which presumes the necessity of carrots and sticks,
legitimacy harnesses the power of internal commitment and
volitional participation.R Legitimacy replaces the Holmesian "bad
man" with the "faithful man"-an individual who complies with the
law not because he rationally calculates that it is in his best interest
to do so but because he sees himself as a moral actor who divines
that it is right to defer to legitimate authority.9
Critically, perceptions of procedural fairness are outcome
independent. 1D In other words, a defendant or victim need not
realize her objective in order to conclude that enforcement or
adjudicatory practices are legitimate. Likewise, an ordinary citizen
need not determine that the law expresses her personal notion of
morality in order to accept its validity. In this way, procedural
fa-irness differs from outcome-driven normative and psychological
approaches to criminal justice (like distributive justice generally and
moral credibility specifically) that examine whether the law
6. See Tyler, Effective Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 286 (indicating that
"issues of process dominate public evaluations of the police, the courts, and
social regulatory activities").
7. See TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 3 (contrasting the normative
perspective on why people follow the law with the instrumental perspective,
which relies on incentives and penalties to shape behavior); Robinson,
Normative Crime Control, supra note 3, at 1861-69.
8. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that the person who is
normatively committed to obeying the law will do so "irrespective of whether
they risk punishment for breaking the law"); Tom Tyler, Psychology and
Institutional Design, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 801, 801-08, 813-16 (2008).
9. See TYLER & Huo, TRUST IN THE LAw, supra note 1, at xiv ("This belief is
distinguished from the view that it is in one's self-interest to accept those
judgments. Individuals with strong beliefs in the legitimacy of the police and
the courts are more inclined to self·regulation; they take personal responsibility
for following laws, accept the decisions of legal authorities, and are more likely
to defer voluntarily to individual police officers and judges.").
10. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 5 ("[J]ustice concerns are seen as acting
independently of the influence of an outcome's favorability."); Tyler & Fagan,
supra note 1, at 240-41 ("Studies ... find that procedures are judged against
ethical criterion of their appropriateness that are distinct from the favorability
or fairness of the outcomes of such procedures.").
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produces results that accord with communal intuitions of just
deserts.ll
Because the concept of procedural fairness is not
dependent upon piecemeal review of substantive outcomes, positive
or negative perceptions possess significant potential to motivate or
undermine deference to power, thus transferring broad discretionary
authority to the state.l 2 In this way, legitimacy may produce
compliance and cooperation with not just an immediate enforcement
effort but across codes and cases, and even actors and institutions.l3
Thus, for legal authorities, cultivating perceptions of legitimacy is of
particularly useful and flexible value.l 4
But what does the public perceive to be legitimate procedures
and practices?
What minimum standards are shared across
demographics and cultures? We can provide no definitive answers
to these questions in this space. Nevertheless, a fair consensus has
developed over the principal criteria that typify procedural fairness.
Legitimacy may be measured by the quality of decision making or
the quality of treatment of defendants.15
More specifically,
procedures are legitimate when they are neutral, accurate,
consistent, trustworthy, and fair-when they provide opportunities

11 See generally Michael D. Reisig ct al., The Construct Validity and
Refinement of Process-Based Policing Measures, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005
(2007).
12. See TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 4 (''Although both morality and

legitimacy are normative, they are not identical. Leaders are especially
interested in having legitimacy in the eyes of their followers, because legitimacy
most effectively provides them with discretionary authority that they can use in
governing."); Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 72~-24.
13. See TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 29; Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and
Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307,
319-24 (2009).
14. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 709-23.
15. See, e.g., Reisig et al., supra note 11, at 1006; Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J.
Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of
Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253, 277 (2004). In
numerous articles, Tom Tyler, Allan Lind, and Yuen Huo have found
remarkable consistency across cultures and demographic groups in the criteria
used to define fair procedures. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind, Yuen J. Huo & Tom R.
Tyler, ... And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for Dispute
Resolution Procedures, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1994); E. Allan Lind, Tom
R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in the
Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 767 (1997); Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of
Fair Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAw &
Soc'y REV. 809 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of
Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 983
(2000); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: lfhat
Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal
Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2001); Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 103 (1988) [hereinafter Tyler, lfhat is Procedural Justice?].
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for error correction and for interested parties to be heard. 1fi Legal
authorities are legitimate when they act impartially, honestly,
transparently, respectfully, ethically, and equitably.17 The criminal
justice system that optimally expresses these values is not only
morally defensible but also quite probably stable and effective.

B.

Moral Credibility
It has long been assumed that in determining how to distribute
punishment-how much to whom?-the goals of doing justice and
fighting crime inevitably conflict. The traditional crime-control
principles of deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation of the
dangerous would distribute criminal liability and punishment in
ways quite different from the distributive principle of moral desert.
Retributivists and utilitarian crime-control advocates commonly saw
their dispute as irreconcilable, and in a sense it is. However, what
has been referred to as the "empirical desert" or "moral credibility"
literature has argued that, in another sense, these two fundamental
aims of criminal justice may not conflict. Doing justice may be the
most effective means of fighting crime. 1s
The hitch is that it is not moral philosophy's deontological
notion of justice that has crime-control power, but rather the
community's shared principles of justice, what has been called
"empirical desert." This turns out to be both good and bad for
constructing a distributive principle for criminal liability and
punishment.
On the one hand, unlike moral philosophy's
deontological
desert,
empirical
desert
can
be
readily
operationalized--its rules and principles can be authoritatively
determined through social science research into people's shared
intuitions of justice. On the other hand, people's shared intuitions of
justice are not justice, in a transcendent sense. People's shared
intuitions can be wrong. In the end, however, the retributivist may
find that an instrumentalist distributive principle of empirical

16. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 7, 117; Casper et al., supra note 1, at
486; Robert Folger, Distributive and Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of
''Voice" and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 108, 108 (1977); Tyler, "What Is Procedural Justice?, supra note 15, at
129; Tom Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Justice and Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK
OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 295, 300 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett
eds., 2004).
17. See, e.g., JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE 171
(2003) (discussing the importance of police respect and concluding that "[p]olice
respect enhances compliance, and police disrespect diminishes compliance");
Casper et al., supra note 1, at 486; Tyler, "What is Procedural Justice?, supra
note 15, at 129.
lK See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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desert will produce far more deontological desert than any other
workable principle that could or would be adopted. 1 9
As has been argued elsewhere, the crime-control benefits from
dit;tributing punishment according to people's shared intuitions of
justice are thought to arise from a variety of sources. 2 0 Some of the
system's power to gain compliance derives from its potential to
stigmatize, which can be a powerful, yet essentially cost-free, control
mechanism for many offenders. Yet a criminal law can stigmatize
only if it has earned moral credibility with the community it
governs. That is, for conviction to trigger community stigmatization,
the law must have earned a reputation with the community for
accurately reflecting the community's views on what deserves moral
condemnation. A criminal law with liability and punishment rules
that conflict with a community's shared intuitions of justice will
undermine its moral credibility.
Another value of moral credibility comes from the fact that
effective operation of a criminal justice system depends on the
cooperation, or at least the acquiescence, of the system's witnesses,
jurors, police, prosecutors, judges, offenders, and others. To the
extent that people see the system as in conflict with their judgments
of justice, that acquiescence and cooperation is likely to fade and be
replaced with resistance and subversion.z1
Subversion and
resistance may take the form of either an impulse toward apathy or
an impulse toward self-help.zz
That is, people may turn to
vigilantism in reaction to a perceived failure of justice. More
commonly, people may resist or subvert the system in less dramatic
ways. Witnesses may lose an incentive to offer their information or
testimony. Citizens may fail to report crimes in the first instance.
Jurors may disregard their jury instructions.
Police officers,
prosecutors, and judges may make up their own rules. And
offenders may resist adjudication proces::;es and punishments rather
than participate in them.
An even greater power of moral credibility comes through a less
obvious mechanism. The real power to gain compliance with
society's rules of conduct lies not in the threat of official sanction but
rather in the influence of the forces of social and individual moral
controJ.23 It is the networks of interpersonal relationships, the
19. See generally Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the
Competition Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MAllY L.
REV. 1831 (2007).
20. For a fuller account, sec generally ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES,
supra note 3, at 175-210; Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 3;
Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 3; Robinson et al.,
Disutility of Injustice, supra note 3, at 1995-2025.
21. Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 153 (2008).
22. Id. at 153-54.
23. Id. at 154.
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social norms shared among those relationships and transmitted
through those social networks, and the internalization of those
norms that control people's conduct. The law is not irrelevant to
these forces. Criminal law plays a central role in creating and
maintaining the social consensus nece~sary for sustaining moral
norms. In a society as diverse as ours, the criminal law may be the
only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and ethnic
differences.2 4 Thus, its most important real-world effect may be its
ability to assist in the building, shaping, and maintaining of these
norms. It can help build and harness the compliance-producing
power of interpersonal relationships and personal morality, but only
if it has earned a reputation for moral credibility with its
community. A criminal law that has been found to be off the mark
in its past condemnations and punishments can be simply dismissed
as just "wrong again."
The criminal law with moral credibility also can gain deference
and compliance in the particularly difficult case of borderline or new
offenses. If the law has earned a reputation as a reliable statement
of community views, people are more likely to defer to its commands
as morally authoritative in those borderline cases in which the
propriety of the conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the
actor. This can be an important role. In a society with the complex
interdependencies of ours, seemingly harmless conduct can have
seriously harmful consequences. When the conduct is criminalized,
one would want the citizen to respect the law even if he or she does
not fully understand why it is forbidden. Such deference is more
likely where citizens have come to see the criminal law as accurate
in announcing condemnable behavior.25
The extent of the criminal law's effectiveness in all these
respects-in harnessing the power of stigmatization, in reducing
resistance and subversion to a system perceived as unjust, in
facjlitating, communicating, and maintaining societal norms, and in
gaining compliance in borderline cases-is to a large extent
dependent on the degree to which the criminal law has gained moral
credibility in the minds of the citizens governed by it. If the law
assigns liability and punishment in ways that the community26
perceives as consistent with its shared intuitions of justice, it gains
deference, cooperation, and compliance. If its judgments regularly
conflict with community views, its work is undermined by those who
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The :relevant "community" is that to be governed by the contemplated
liability rule. In the United States, where the governing criminal laws are
contained primarily in state criminal codes, the relevant community for
determining a code's rule will be the residents of the state. However, one can
imagine situations in which the relevant community in shaping the practice,
procedure or rule is larger (the federal criminal code) or smaller (local court
sentencing practices).
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see it as unjust. Recent empirical studies have confirmed these
effects of a system's moral credibility. The studies suggest that the
greater the perception that the criminal law's liability and
punishment rules conflict with a person's own judgments of justice,
the less likely the person is to respect that criminal law as a moral
authority and, therefore, the less likely to support, cooperate, and
comply with that criminallaw.27

II. SHAPING REPUTATION
What do we know about public perceptions of the legitimacy of
police practices and adjudicative procedures? What do we know
about public perceptions of the moral credibility of liability and
punishment rules? In this Part, we explore what is understood
about how criminal justice systems develop reputations for
legitimacy or moral credibility, and we conclude that-at least when
it comes to the legitimacy of specific enforcement and adjudication
practices and procedures-what is understood is not yet enough.

Creating Legitimacy
By now, scholars have tested legitimacy in a variety of legal
contexts and even in social settings beyond the law.zs Our analysis
is limited to a slice of the existing work that relates to two criminaljustice contexts: what constitutes professional and unprofessional
enforcement practices, and what constitutes fair and unfair
adjudicative procedures. Within these narrow domains, scholars
have done both substantial work and, we think, not quite enough.
They have examined perceptions of legitimacy among a host of
subpopulations: suspects, defendants, witnesses, victims, and
ordinary citizens. 29 They have studied procedural fairness in

A.

27. See infra Part III.B.
28. See, e.g., Sheldon Alexander & Marian Ruderman, The Role of
Procedural and Distributive Justice in Organizational Behavior, 1 Soc. JUST.
RES. 177 (1987); Mark R. Fondacaro et al., Procedural Justice in Resolving
Family Disputes: A Psychosocial Analysis of Individual and Family Functioning
in Late Adolescence, 27 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 101 (1998); RebP.cca
Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law:
Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DJSP. RESOL. 1,
6-7 (2011); Shelly Jackson & Mark Fondacaro, Procedural Justice in Resolving
Family Conflict: Implications for Youth Violence Prevention, 21 LAw & PoL'Y 101
(1999); Heather J. Smith et al., The Self-Relevant Implications of the GroupValue Model: Group Membership, Self- Worth, and Treatment Quality, 34 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYr.HOL. 470 {1998); Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee
Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The Value of SelfRegulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287 (2005).
29. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 1; Michael D. Reisig et al., Suspect
Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JUST. Q. 241 (2004); Michael D. Reisig &
Gorazd Mesko, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Prisoner Misconduct, 15
PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 41, 41-49 (2009); Tom R. Tyler, "Legitimacy in
Corrections':· Policy Implications, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. PoL'Y 127 (2010); Tom
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courthouses, in police precincts, and on police beats. And they have
consistently found that fair treatment affects attitudes toward legal
authorities (though fairness may play a greater or lesser role,
depending on the particular context and circumstancc).30 But
beyond the most obviously controversial enforcement tactics and
adjudicatory procedures, surprisingly little is known about which
practices laypersons perceive to be most professional and
unprofessional, fair and unfair.3 1 The gap is especially unfortunate
because legitimacy has the potential to do its best work at the
margins. More concretely, public perceptions would seem to hold
the most sway on otherwise close questions.
One difficulty is that there is no clear consensus on which
mechanism or mechanisms lead people to adopt perceptions of
legitimacy in the first instance. In their seminal early study, John
Thibaut and Laurens Walker indicated that individuals prefer fair
procedures because such procedures are ultimately more likely to
produce just outcomes. 32 In short, a fair procedure fosters a greater
likelihood of a just substantive outcome, even if that favorable
outcome does not, in fact, come to pass in the immediate case. By
contrast, Tom Tyler has argued that procedural fairness has
normative value wholly independent of outcome because legitimate
practices convey respect for the individual and thereby promote selfesteem.33 More recently, Kees van den Bos, Allen Lind, and others
speculated that fair procedures might influence systemil:
satisfaction by reducing uncertainty.3 4 In short, the question 1s
unsettled and is just one of many ripe areas for continued study.

R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of Their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 51 (1984) (analyzing legitimacy of
experiences with enforcement and adjudication of traffic offenses).
30. Compare TYLER & Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 1, at 196 (finding
that generally "people's main consideration when avaluating the police and the
courts is the treatment that they feel people receive from those authorities")
(emphasis added), with Casper ct al., supra note 1, at 494-96 (observing that
procedural fairness is related to defendant satisfaction even in high-stakes
felony cases, but also acknowledging that concerns with outcome and
distributive justice also play significant roles), and Reisig et al., supra note 11,
at 1024 (finding that procedural fairness is an important, but not exclusive,
determinant of perceptions of legitimacy).
31. McCLUSKEY, supra note 17, at 28-29 (observing that the data are
relatively thin on the precise procedures that generate perceptions oflegitimacy
or procedural fairness).
32. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 1, at 4.
33. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of
the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 8RO (1989); Tom R.
Tyler & Allen A Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (Mark. P. Zanna ed., 1992).
34. Kees van den Bos et al., How Do I Judge My Outcome VVhen I Do Not
Know the Outcome of Others? The Psychology of the Fair Process Effect, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1034, 1042-45 (1997).
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Other open questions concern what marks the essentials of
professional enforcement and fair adjudication, whether some values
are more essential than others, and whether perceptions of any such
minimum standards are universal across cultures and experiences
(and are therefore largely resistant to habituation, education, and
attempted manipulation). It would seem to us that perceptions of
procedural fairness are more malleable than intuitions about
distributive justice. After all, we see striking consistency across
cultures when it comes to perceptions of the relative severity of
different types of misconduct.35 By contrast, we see dramatic
differences in the procedural norms honored by otherwise similar
liberal Western states.36
Beyond such rough-and-ready speculation, however, we do not
attempt to answer these questions. For present purposes, we think
it enough to review the extant scholarship and highlight certain
unexplored or underexplored practices and procedures, many of
which are neither obviously legitimate nor illegitimate, but that
present potentially fruitful areas for future examination of the
question.

1.

Fair Enforcement

Professional policing regulates social behavior through fair
procedures and practices. As indicated, a fair procedure may consist
of fair decision making or fair treatment. Specifically, people are
likelier to perceive police decision making as fair when officers make
decisions according to readily discernible and generally applicable
rules, standards, and guidelines. Likewise, people are likelier to
perceive police treatment as fair when officers behave in manners
that are trustworthy, equitable, dignified, and respectfu}.37
Almost certainly, the police lose perceived legitimacy when they
intentionally or willfully (or even recklessly or negligently) employ
excessive force. This is a somewhat straightforward issue, and it
need not detain us long. It goes without saying that, for any number
of normative and instrumental reasons beyond perceptions of
legitimacy, police should refrain from the kinds of abuses of power
made infamous by the beating of Rodney King, 3 8 the killing of

35. See generall_y Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and
Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007).
36. See, e.g., .John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal
Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978). Nevertheless, Tom
Tyler and Allan Lind have found that the criteria used to define fair procedures
are similar across cultures and demographic groups. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, ANNALS AM. ACAD.
PoL. & Soc. Sci., May 2004, at 84, 94-99 (2004).
38. Hector Tobar & Richard Lee Colvin, Witnesses Depict Relentless
Beating, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at B1.
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Arthur McDuffie,39 or the sodomizing of Abner Louima.4o Instances
of extreme and intentional illegitimate behavior, even if isolated,
may profoundly impact perceptions of the legitimacy of legal
authorities because "people are more strongly influenced by negative
experiences than by positive experiences."41 This asymmetry is not
terrifically surprising. Individuals-at least those who start out
believing their institutions are legitimate-anticipate positive
experiences with authority. Consequently, their positive perceptions
remain somewhat static following fair treatment but may be
undercut by even a single instance of unfair treatment. Moreover,
in the digital age, instances of police· abuse are likelier to be
recorded and broadcast to a wider audience, as demonstrated
recently by the negligent homicide of Oscar Grant by a transit
officer in Oakland, California-a killing that was captured by six
separate cell-phone video cameras.42 And, of course, such images of
negative treatment are likelier to be disseminated virally than banal
images of respectful or pleasant police-citizen encounters.
More difficult questions arise when police engage in run-of-themill unprofessional practices-when they are brusque, insensitive,
rude, or dishonest. For instance, police sometimes engage in the
illegitimate practice of providing doctored testimony or police
reports to justify arrests, searches, or identification and
interrogation procedures-the so-called "testilying" phenomenon.43
More generally, police may behave impolitely, aggressively, or
dismissively in their day-to-day interactions with civilians. Again, it
may be enough to say that-for reasons of human decency and
procedural fairness-police should strive to interact civilly with
suspects, witnesses, victims, and the general public. But beyond
such platitudes, the existing literature offers some lessons. First,
police may undermine perceptions of legitimacy by showing force
39. Ex-Officer Tells Court of Role in Miami Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1980, at All (describing fatal beating and cover-up that arose out of alleged
traffic infraction and subsequent high-speed chase).
40. Leonard Levitt, The Louima Verdicts, Some Splits, But Blue Wall
Stands, NEWSDAY, June 9, 1999, at A4.
41. See TYLER & Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW, supra note 1, at 39 ("[A]ttitudes
become more negative following unfavorable experiences but remain the same
following positive experiences.").
42. Jesse McKinley, Officer Guilty of Manslaughter in Killing that Inflamed
Oakland, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at All; see also Seth Mydans, Videotaped
Beating by Officers Pu.ts Full Glare on Brutality Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1991, at Al.
43. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEW YORK,
ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS 36 (1994) [hereinafter THR MOLLEN
REPORT], available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/4%20%20Mollen%20Commission%20-%20NYPD.pdf (finding an
epidemic of
"falsifications" by the New York Police Department in the 1990s); I. Bennett
Capers, Crime, Legitimacy and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 868-71 (2008)
(discussing the frequency of "testilying").
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rather than soliciting consent politely (even in circumstances where
force is justifiable and where consent is not legally required). 4 4
Second, isolated incidents of low-level unprofessionalism are likelier
to influence individuals' attitudes toward the police when the
contact is citizen-initiated, as opposed to police-initiated.45 Third,
negative perceptions of unprofessional policing may prove persistent
enough to affect, in turn, perceptions of prosecutorial practices and
judicial adjudicative procedures. Specifically, Jonathan Casper
found that "aspects of police treatment ... spill over onto defendant
evaluations of their experience with courtroom personnel and their
general sense of fair treatment." 46
The thorniest questions involve police practices that are merely
controversial-practices that may be considered procedurally unfair
from one view, but that also may be defensible from some valid
alternative perspective or for some valid alternative reason. It is
especially interesting to consider whether the Supreme Court's
constitutional acceptance or rejection of these borderline police
practices aligns with the public's perceptions of procedural fairness.
By way of example, constitutional criminal procedure questions
frequently turn on analyses of expectations, understandings, or
beliefs of the so-called "reasonable man." Yet, the Court has done
almost no work to determine whether its conceptions of the
reasonable layperson dovetail with what people actually find fair in
a given context. For instance, to determine whether police have
engaged in a search subject to Fourth Amendment inquiry, a court
must ask whether police have intruded on a defendant's reasonable
or legitimate expectation of privacy.47 To reach this determination,
the court must make an evaluative judgment of which activities
(and in what contexts) a given society at a given time perceives to be
sufficiently private to merit constitutional protection. But the Court
provides no empirical bases for its assertions of what constitutes
reasonable expectations of privacy within communities. The danger
is that the average person may find the Court's folk psychological
assessment of the average person's beliefs to be disingenuously
44. See, e.g., Robin Shepard Engel, Citizens' Perceptions of Distributive and
Procedural Injustice During Traffic Stops with Police, 42 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 445, 469 (2005) (reporting that when police use force citizens are many
times more likely to perceive procedural injustice, and concluding that "law
enforcement officials may need to reconsider their policies guiding the use of
consent and other types of discretionary searches"); see McCLUSKEY, supra note
17, at 43-44, 171-72.
45. Dennis P. Rosenbaum et al., Attitudes Towards the Police: The Effects of
Direct and Vicarious Experiences, 8 POLICE Q. 343, 358--59 (2005). A possible
explanation is that individuals who initiate contact with law enforcement do so
because they hold police in higher esteem and trust police to provide help. Such
faith may be shaken thereafter by even a single unprofessional encounter.
46. Casper et al., supra note 1, at 498.
47. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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cramped or expansive.48 In such circumstances, the public may
come to perceive unfairness along any of three dimensions. First,
the public may consider the court to be dishonest, nontransparent,
or perhaps even biased. Second, the public may take the court to be
insufficiently sensitive to societal needs for effective law
enforcement. Third, the public may construe the court to be an
unaccountable and nonresponsive body that substitutes its own
preferences for popularly held value judgments.
To illustrate, the Supreme Court has held that a person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in her closed trash,49 her bank5 0
and telephone records,51 or her real property as viewed aerially.sz
Conversely, the Court has held that a person possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the heat emanating from her home. 5 3
These intuitions are not definitively inaccurate. For instance,
social-science findings indicate that average lay perceptions, in fact,
appear to align with the Court's determinations5 4 that police
implicate no reasonable expectation of privacy by (1) subjecting
luggage to dog sniffs for contraband, 55 (2) tracking vehicles'
movements remotely,5 6 or (3) observing private property from
hovering helicopters.5 7 But, when the Court relies on intuitions, it
runs a sign1ficant risk that those intuitions may be wrong. After all,
judicial intuitions are just that-divinations of societal expectations
grounded in no more than a hunch; deductions about what, to use
Justice Harlan's phrasing, "society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."'5B Thus, it may be that the public agrees that, say, a
person lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy against everyone
once she has "knowingly exposed" information to anyone. 59 But it
48. AP. HBRBER'r, UNCOMMON LAW 4 (1974).
49. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
50. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
51. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
52. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
53. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001).
54. SHMUEL LOCK, CRIME, PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE
TOLF.RANT PUBLIC 39 (1999) (finding that 91 % of the public approved of the
Court's limitation on a reasonable expectation of privacy); Christopher Slobogin
& Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in

Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized
and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L .•J. 727, 739 (1993) (finding that
respondents, given fifty hypothetical police practices, ranked aerial observation
and electronic tracking among less intrusive activities).
55. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
56. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (permitting remote
tracking of vehicles).
fi7. Riley, 488 U.S. at 450--51 (permitting helicopter surveillance).
58. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. Compare United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (finding that
an individual "takes the risk, jn revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government"), with RONALD
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may well be otherwise. Indeed, the few social scientists who have
studied these questions have found that the public disagrees with
the Court on at least some Fourth Amendment search questions.
For instance, one study found that the public perceives the practice
of allowing police to inspect bank records to be highly intrusive,
notwithstanding judicial tolerance for the practice. 60
Of course, this concern is not exclusive to constitutional
questions of what courts and the public perceive to be reasonable
expectations of privacy. Analogously, in the context of Fourth
Amendment consent questions, courts ask whether defendants
reasonably feel free to refuse police requests.6I In the context of
Fourth Amendment seizure questions, courts ask whether
defendants reasonably feel free to leave or otherwise end police
encounters. 62 Again and again, in the context of constitutional
regulation of police conduct, courts take up questions of societal
perspective without the benefit of empirical guidance. As indicated,
a given court's intuitions may be right. Indeed, the social science
J.

ALLRN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 378-79 (2d ed. 2005)
("Though the Court has viewed such 'sharing' [of information] as proof of the
absence of reasonable privacy expectations, it is not clear that citizens view
privacy in the same way."), and Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privac.Y and the Fourth
Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 159~1 (1987)
("Much of what is important in human life takes place in a situation of shared
privacy. The important events in our lives are shared with a chosen group of
others; they do not occur in isolation, nor are they open to the entire world.").
60. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 54, at 740. We must acknowledge,
however, that there may be something of a dynamic relationship between court
decisions and public perceptions. Specifically, one study found that lawyers
(whose attitudes are more likely shaped by Supreme Court jurisprudence) were
more tolerant than the public of allowing police to rifle through trash bags left
outside the home-a practice that, as indicated, the Court freely permits. LOCK,
supra note 54, at 39 (finding that only 49% of the public approved of the
practice as compared to 64 % of lawyers); see also California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988). Comparatively, the study found that the public was far
likelier than lawyers to approve of suspicionless vehicle searches during routine
traffic stops-a practice that the Court constitutionally constrains. LOCK, supra
note 54, at 40-42 (finding that 44% of the public approved of the practice as
compared to only 10% of lawyers); see Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716
(2009) (limiting vehicle searches incident to arrest to areas within arrestee's
reach); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (limiting vehicle
searches, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, to
those areas of the car where police have probable cause to believe evidence
could be found); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973)
(requiring that consent for search be voluntary). We take this as another sign
that perceptions of fairness are somewhat more malleable than perceptions of
distributive justice, which may signal that judicial deviations from perceptions
of fairness are perhaps less problematic than more consistent (and culturally
and temporarily resistant) perceptions of distributive justice.
61. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996); Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 22526.
62. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980).
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indicates that lay perceptions apparently align with the judicial
determination that police may not solicit consent based on false
claims of legal authority to search.63 But, on other questions, it
appears that courts may have it wrong. For instance, public
perceptions are apparently at odds with decisions that, on the one
hand, prohibit further interrogation once a suspect asks for
counsel64 and, on the other, authorize undercover agents to trick a
suspect into confessing to crime. 65 In a similar vein, findings
suggest that-notwithstanding the Court's view to the contrary66_
reasonable people rarely feel free to refuse police requests.
Specifically, one study found that eighty percent of suspects
acquiesced to police search requests because they believed that the
police would search even without consent.6 7 Another study found
that most suspects did not feel free to leave or refuse to answer
police questions in the context of street stops and bus interdiction.6B
As these studies suggest, when courts pay insufficient attention
to public perceptions, they may come to make unreasonable claims
about the reasonable man.
Courts may endorse ostensible
reasonable beliefs that the reasonable public does not, in fact,
share-that the public, instead, perceives to be either too deferential
to the criminal class or, conversely, insufficiently protective of any
citizen (save for the very paranoid). To the extent judicial intuitions
63. LOCK, supra note 51, at 48 (finding that 90% of the public disapproves
of permitting police to solicit consent based on a false claim of legal authority);
see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
64. LOCK, supra note 54, at 46 (finding 52% approval of allowing continued
interrogation after suspect asks for counsel). The Supreme Court has found
such questioning unconstitutional in certain circumstances. See Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) ("Whatever else it may mean, the right to
counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that
a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial
proceedings have been initiated against him 'whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment."' (quoting mrby
v. Illinois, 402 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). But see Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct.
1213, 1222-24 (2010) (permitting interrogation after a fourteen day break in
custody).
65. LOCK, supra note 54, at 46 (finding only 36% approval for confessions
produced by police deception). Contra Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297-300
(1990) (permitting questioning by undercover law enforcement personnel).
66. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438.
67. Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of
Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 204; see also Ilya Lichtenberg, Miranda in
Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the 'Voluntary" Waiver of Fourth Amendment
Rights, 44 How. L.J. 349, 367 (2001). However, another study indicated that
suspects did not perceive as coercive police requests to search their residences.
Dorothy K.agehiro, Perceived Voluntariness of Consent to Warrantless Police
Searches, 18 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 38-49 (1988).
68. David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth
Amendment's Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 53 (2009);
Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 54, at 742 (finding that respondents ranked
police requests to search luggage on bus as highly intrusive).
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deviate from the lay perspective, courts risk undermining
perceptions of legitimacy both by misapplying the relevant standard
and by empowering police conduct that the public may find
normatively problematic. Admittedly, courts may be less than
perfectly competent to analyze and utilize social science, but goodfaith efforts to do so are undoubtedly superior to empty reliance on
rank speculation.
The takeaway is not just that courts should take seriously-at
least as a factor-lay perceptions of fairness but that social
scientists should get serious about the business of measuring those
perceptions. For instance, social scientists could measure lay
perspectives toward court decisions empowering police to arrest
suspects for even nonjailable offenses (like driving without a
seatbelt);69 to engage in pretextual stops and suspicion-less drug
interdiction;70 to follow a fleeing suspect without triggering
constitutional inquiry; 71 and to use evidence of flight to support a
finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.72 In formulating
these and other investigatory rules and standards, the Court has
appealed to its notions of "common sense," of "ordinary human
experience,"73 and of the "practical considerations of everyday life"74
without demonstrating that the public shares its notions. The
public may approve of, say, high-volume, relatively unintrusive
police practices, like Terry stops and frisks, or it may instead favor
low-volume (but perhaps more intrusive) practices, like house
searches. The legitimacy project potentially has much to say on
these questions. And, by listening, the system may cultivate
deference for its rules and institutions.
Significantly, the Court may not be alone in reaching unfounded
empirical conclusions about public perceptions.
A number of
scholars have invoked the legitimacy project to advance pet projects
and advocate pet reforms.
For instance, for academics and
observers troubled by the racially and economically disparate
impacts of policing, it is tempting to conclude, without firm
empirical bases, that urban communities find unfair aggressive
order-maintenance policing and stop-and-frisk practices. 75 This is
69. Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
70. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 194 (2002); Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431.
71. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).
72. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000).
73. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) ("Much as a 'bright
line' rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention
is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern
over rigid criteria.").
74. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983).
75. See, e.g., K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from ·Broken Windows: The
Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 271, 279-80 (2009); Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force-Why Patrick
Dorismond Didn't Have to Die, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000, at 27; Bob
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not to say that the claim is incorrect. To the contrary, there are
strong indications that heavy-handed and targeted policing does
indeed engender public disaffection and thereby may prove
counterproductive (particularly in the historically disadvantaged
communities that tend to be subject to high levels of enforcement).76
But that is not the point. The point is that we do not definitively
know. And, in such circumstances, academics should resist the
temptation to rely too casually on the legitimacy project as a fulcrum
to leverage idiosyncratic preferences and conceptions of what
constitutes professional policing. Academics may appropriately offer
policy prescriptions based on suggestive data, but they ought to
acknowledge that the data is less than clear.
How, then, might an academic appropriately confront concerns
about the perceived legitimacy of borderline practices? The glib oneword answer is "carefully." But, of course, we need to say more. The
scholar must keep a focus on the complexities of legitimacy
questions. Practices are multifaceted, and the public may perceive
as fair or unfair some aspects or the frequency of a given practice.
Herbert, Op-Ed., Jim Crow Policing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A27
(characterizing stop and frisk as "a despicable, racially oriented tool of
harassment," and describing the department's use of the stops as a
"shameful ... abomination ... mistreatment ... [and a l nonstop humiliation of
young black and Hispanic New Yorkers, including children, by police officers
who feel no obligation to treat them fairly or with any respect at all").
76. Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MA.RQ. L. RF.V. 85, 92-94
(2007); Rosen, supra note 75, at 27 (quoting Professor Dan Kahan, who
indicated that order-maintenance policing is "a drug whose primary effect is
that it will reduce crime, and its side effect is that it may exacerbate political
ten~ions"); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order

Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men's Perceptions of Police
Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 272 (2010); see also NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AGENCY, TRENDS IN CASE AND DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND
CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING AND OUTCOMES, IN NON-FELONY ARRESTS
PROSECUTED IN NEW YORK CITY'S CRIMINAL COURTS 38-39 (2002),
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/fnrep02.pdf ("The strained nature of policecommunity relations has been recognized by the NYPD leadership, which has
been developing since
1996 new
initiatives to
improve
these
relationships ...."); Excerpts From Remarks By the District Attorney, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at B5 (quoting Bronx District Attorney, Robert T. Johnson,
discussing order-maintenance policing: "Feelings of fear and frustration
abound. Troubling questions have been raised, particularly in communities of
color ... regarding police-community relations, civil liberties and the issue of
respect. . . . These questions must be addressed."); see also infra note 85 and
accompanying text. See generally George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Gang
Behavior, Law Enforcement, and Community Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC
POLICY 191 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (noting that using "bricks and
sticks" to enforce crime in ways that communities find unfair "may be selfdefeating"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American

Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice
Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 336, 338 (2011) (discussing
implications of police treatment of civilians on perceptions of procedural
justice).
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Thorough analysis of legitimacy questions, thus, demands thorough
understanding of the practice in question. By way of example,
consider the aforementioned practices of order-maintenance policing
and attendant stops and frisks-policing practices that have been
the subject of particularly sharp criticism from scholars and civil
libertarians who believe that such efforts have "reduce[d] the
perceived legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public,"77
especially where the efforts have been concentrated m
predominately poor and minority high-crime neighborhoods.78
A brief description of each practice is in order. First, ordermaintenance policing concentrates enforcement efforts on petty
public-order offenses. The strategy is typically based on the broken
windows theory, which posits that disorder, if tolerated, may foster
an environment of more serious crimeJ9 Numerous urban police
departments-most notably, the New York City Police Department
("NYPD")-have embraced order-maintenance policing over the past
two decades, leading to hundreds of thousands of additional arrests
for minor crimes. 80 Second, stop-and-frisk procedures (or so-called
Terry stops and frisks) consist of brief detentions and searches based
on "reasonable suspicion"-a standard that is less than probable
cause. 81 Specifically, under Terry, an officer has constitutional
discretion to stop a suspect and frisk him for a weapon where the
officer can articulate specific facts to support a reasonable suspicion
that the suspect is armed and has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a crime.s2 Significantly, stop-and-frisk practices
and order-maintenance policing are related, because a department
that prioritizes public order will often come to rely heavily on stop

77. Ray Rivera et aL, A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2010, at Al (quoting Professor Richard Rosenfeld); see also Gau
& Brun:;on, supra note 76, at 27~; supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
78. Bowers, supra note 76, at 87-88; Gau & Brunson, supra note 76, at 267;
Rivera et aL, supra note 77, at A17.
79. Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence
from New York City and a Five-C£ty Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271,
280-81 (2006).
80. N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, supra note 76, at 39 (finding a more
than two-fold rise in the number of nonfelony arrests in New York City between
1989 and 1998, from 86,822 in 1989 to 176,432 in 1998 and finding a more than
seven-fold rise in the number of drug arrests between 1975 and 1998, from
17,207 in 1975 to 121,661 in 1998); JOHN JAY COLLEGE CENTER ON RACE, CRTME
AND JUSTICE, STOP, QUESTION & FRISK POLICING PRACTICES IN NEW YORK CITY: A
PRIMER
4-5
(2010),
[hereinafter
STOP
&
FRISK]
available
at
http://www .jjay.cuny. ed u/web_images/PRIMER_electronic_version. pdf
(describing order-maintenance policing efforts in New York City, Los Angeles,
and Philadelphia); Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
407, 422-40 (2000) (describing order-maintenance policing efforts in New York
City, Boston, and Chicago).
81. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968).
82. Id. at 21.
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and frisk. 83
For instance, use of Terry stops by the NYPD
skyrocketed dramatically from approximately 97,000 such stops in
2002, to more than 160,000 stops in 2003, to nearly 580,000 stops in
2009. 84
Without question, these policing efforts can be aggressive, but
have they, in fact, generated disapproval from the public? Or is the
academic perception of backlash a false academic perception of
public perception? On this central question, there is a remarkable
lack of empirical evidence. In all likelihood, the answer is nuanced.
On the one hand, there appears to be a genuine perception among at
least some people in some neighborhoods that stop-and-frisk and
order-maintenance policing practices are invidious and thereby
unfair. 85 On the other hand, most people approve of Terry stops and
frisks.sa Ultimately, there is probably significant variation in
83. Rivera et al., supra note 76, at Al7 ("'The stops conducted by us are to
address ... the quality-of-life issues." (quoting NYPD department head)).
84. STOP & FRISK, supra note 80, at 4; Rivera et al., supra note 76, at Al7;
cf. Colleen Long, Police Stop More than 1 Million People on the Street,
HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2009/10/08/stop-and-frisk-police-sto_n_314509.html (detailing doubling of stops
in Philadelphia and Los Angeles).
85. ALLEN et al., supra note 59, at 569 ("There is substantial evidence that
aggressive use, and misuse of the stop-and-frisk power continues to be a major
source of tension between police and people of color."); see supra note 65 and
accompanying text. Notably, the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (also known as the "Kerner Commission") attributed indiscriminate
stop-and-frisk practices with contributing to the "deep hostility between police
and ghetto communities" that ultimately led to the deadly urban race riots of
the 1960s. Debra Livingston, Gang Loitering, The Court> and Some Realism
About Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 177-78 (1999). More generally,
studies have shown that as many as two-thirds of African Americans perceive
the criminal justice system to be racist, as opposed to less than one-third of
whites. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 699 (1995); see also Lawrence D.
Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment: Black and VVhite Americans>
Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DuBOIS REV. 151, 156
(2004); Richard J. Lundman & Robert L. Kaufman, Driving While Black: Effects

of Race, Ethnicity> and Gender on Citizens Self-Reports of Traffic Stops and
Police Actions, 41 CRHvTINOLOGY 195, 210 (2003) ("[B]eliefs in the legitimacy and
propriety of police actions are framed by a polarity between blacks and
whites."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbls. 2.12.2005, 2.21.2005, 2.0002.2005
(2005), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_2.html (indicating
that compared to white Americans, Mrican Americans are several times more
likely to have a low or very low opinion of the honesty and ethical standards of
police; are almost three times more likely to have very little confidence in the
police; and are more likely to think there is police brutality in their
communities).
86. LOCK, supra note 54, at 41; see also David Thacher, Order Maintenance
Reconsidered: Moving Beyond Strong Causal Reasoning, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 381, 386 (2004) (discussing political popularity of ordermaintenance policing and observing that "challenges to the broken windows
theory have not yet discredited order maintenance policing with policymakers
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perspective within and across populations.87 Specifically, even if the
general public favors these practices, residents of high-crime
neighborhoods would seem to be more conflicted. These residents
internalize directly both the costs and benefits of policing and crime,
and they appear to harbor anxieties about each.88
In such
circumstances, police walk a fine line between impressions of callous
disregard and repressive overreach. And, to effectively chart this
course, police could benefit from rigorous empirical study of the
levels of enforcement that targeted communities perceive to be too
much or not enough. But, to date, there has been too much shouting
and too little study.
Finally, questions about the perceived legitimacy of stop-andfrisk and order-maintenance policing are complicated by questions
about the perceived legitimacy of racial profiling-yet another
nuanced question. And a further complication is that the public
may fail to differentiate what is and is not racial profiling in the
first instance. Specifically, for present purposes, we take racial
profiling to be the practice of using race qua race as a factor in
enforcement decisions. 8 9
This practice is, therefore, to be
distinguished from other types of profiling that merely may
correlate to race or ethnicity.9o On the one hand, the public seems to
overwhelmingly support the use of drug-courier and terrorist
or the public" notwithstanding the fact "among criminologists, order
maintenance is clearly under siege").
87. For example, suspects, arrestees, and defendants seem to more
squarely disapprove of the aggressive approaches. Gau & Brunson, supra note
76, at 266-67 (reporting that "[s]tudy participants believed that the poor
treatment they received from the pohce ... was intimately tied to their status
as poor, urban males," and that participants had concluded that police stop-andfrisk practices were "overly aggressive ... demeaning ... [and] inordinate[ly]
frequen[t]"); Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 262.
88. Bowers, supra note 76, at 91; Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and
Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement:
Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. R.c;v. 137, 140 (1997)
(discussing "dual frustration" in minority communities that "uniquely
experience problems" associated with both crime and criminal enforcement);
Rivera et al., supra note 77 (quoting a community leader who observed that
neighborhood residents "welcome the police" but they "also fear the police
because you can get stopped at any time"); id. (indicating that residents report
that they "philosophically embrace the police presence," but that they "often
come away from encounters with officers feeling violated, degraded and
resentfuf' because "day-to-day interactions with officers can seem so arbitrary").
89. Cf Deborah J. Schildkraut, The Dynamics of Public Opinion on Ethnic
Profiling After 9111: Results from a Survey Experiment, 53 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 61, 67 (2009) (defining racial profiling as decision making based on
the belief that certain racial groups "are more likely than others to commit
certain types of crime"); Racial Profiling and the War on Terror,
PUBLICAGENDA.ORG, http://www.publicagenda.org/red-flags/racial-profili.ng-andwar-terror (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (approving the
use of drug-courier profiles).
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profiles. 9 1 On the other hand, there appears to be something closer
to cross-demographic consensus that racial profiling, as we define it,
is illegitimate. 92 Making matters more complicated still, different
demographic groups tend to disagree about whether a particular
practice is motivated by race (and therefore an instance of what we
take to be genuine racial profiling). 9 3 For instance, one study
indicated that although whites tended to find racial profiling
problematic they were less likely to perceive borderline police
conduct to be discriminatory.9 4 Perhaps for that reason, perceptions
by whites of normatively problematic police conduct were not shown
to influence levels of deference in a statistically significant way,
whereas such perceptions were shown to influence deference levels
amongst minorities.95 Put simply, minorities appear likelier to
believe that illegitimate police practices are not just unfair in the
general sense, but also biased against them.
And two final observations that further muddy the analyses of
racial profiling specifically and order-maintenance policing and stopand-frisk practices generally: First, there also appear to be
generational gaps in perceptions of profiling. 96 Second, perceptions
of profiling-and controversial police practices more generally-are
elastic. At distinct historical moments, tactics like profiling may
look different to the discerning publie.97 Put differently, perceptions
91. LOCK, supra note 54, at 42, 54.
92. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 254 (citing a December 1999 Gallup
poll indicating that more than 80% of Americans "disapprove" of profiling);
Darren K. Carlson, Racial Profiling Seen as Pervasive, Unjust, GALLUP (July 20,
2004), http://www .gallup.com/poll/12406/racial-profiling -~een ·pervasive-unjust
.aspx; see also Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Why Does the
Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and
Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 419, 429 (2011) ("White
respondents view the police as less fair and less legitimate if they target
minorities."); Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 255 ("(W]hen people believe
that profiling is wide~pread and/or that they have been profiled, their support
for the police fades."); Schildkraut, supra note 89, at 70 (finding public
disapproval of racial profiling); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially
Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen Perceptions, 83 Soc. FoRCES 1009,
1025 (2005) (finding public disapproval of racial profiling).
93. Huq et al., supra note 92 ("[M]inority group members are more likely to
However, ... [w]hite
believe that the police 'racially profile' minorities.
respondents [also] view profiling of minorities as unfair and, when they believe
it occurs, view the police as less legitimate."); Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15,
at 275.
94. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15.
95. !d. at 267 ("The results indicate that profiling was directly linked to
legitimacy and performance among minority respondents ... but not among
white respondents. Hence, profiling had a negative impact on policing, but only
among minority respondents.").
96. ld. at 262 (indicating that "young people and those personally involved
in an experience with the police [l have more negative views about them").
97. Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002) ("We had just reached a consensus on
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of profiling have shifted over time depending on the salient
reference point. For example, we could compare responses to the
beating of Rodney King, to the 9/11 terrorist attacks,98 to the
problem of illegal immigration, 99 to the violence associated with the
Mexican drug trade.
Ultimately, the extent to which any of these three related
policing practices-order-maintenance policing, stop-and-frisk
practices, and racial profiling-negatively influence communal
perceptions of legitimacy turns on a definition of the relevant
community. In the separate context of empirical desert, we think it
makes sense to define the relevant community as the populace
covered by a contemplated liability or punishment rule, because the
reach of substantive criminal law typically extends all the way to
the state's borders. But discretionary enforcement practices are
more often developed and implemented locally and, accordingly,
should remain locally responsive.1°0
Thus, in the context of
legitimacy, a narrower definition of community may be warranted,
but it is not clear how to go about coherently narrowing community
to some subset of the sovereign whole.IOI Moreover, it is not even
clear whether the appropriate measure of community ought to be
geographic, cultural, or sociodemographic. Undoubtedly, there are

racial profiling. By September 10, 2001, virtually everyone ... agreed that
racial profiling was very bad. We also knew what racial profiling was . . . . All
this 0 changed in the wake of the September 11 attacks . . . . And now lots of
people are for it.").
98. Huq et al., supra note 92, at 423 ("[P]eople may respond differently to
counterterrorism policing than to crime-control because they view terrorism as
imposing a graver risk of harm to individuals than the more diffuse
consequences of ordinary crime .... [P)eople may have different normative
assessments of crimes and terrorism."); Schildkraut, supra note 89, at 67-78
(finding that support for racial profiling increased when the subject group is
Arab Americans). Nevertheless, the war on terrorism raises its own set of
legitimacy concerns. Several scholars have made the claim that certain
antiterrorism efforts may prove counterproductive, becauoe they are perceived
as illegitimate within the wider Muslim world. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Stephen
J. Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in
Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & Soc'y REV.
365, 374 (2010). Specifically, critics highlight backlash against erroneous
detainment and the relative absence of judicial process. Id. at 371-72. Indeed,
several studies have shown that perceived injustice of American military action
is correlated with support for Iraqi resistance. Id. at 372.
99. See, e.g., S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). A majority of
Americans appear to support the Arizona law. Rasmussen Reports, Nationally,
60% Fauor Letting Local Police Stop and Verify Immigration Status (Apr. 26,
2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_contentlpolitics/current_events
limmigrationlnationally_60_favor_letting_local_police_stop_and_verify_immigra
tion_status.
100. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1969, 2040
(2008).
101. Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Dangers of "Community,"
2003 UTAH L. REV. 343, 343 (2003).

234

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

defensible (or at least workable) definitions, but questions will
remain over whose perceptions should matter when opinions are
split within a given community. For instance, we might prioritize
the perceptions of those most affected by police practices, those most
affected by crime, those constituting a democratic majority, those
who are members of historically subordinated minorities, or those
who are likelier to defer to legitimate authority (if such groups are
identifiable).
Finally, because of the malleability of perceptions of fairness,
legitimacy advocates must reconcile themselves to the fact that a
system premised even partially on legitimacy may come to adopt
procedural rules and standards that may vary from place to place,
community to community, and time to time--a scenario that some
may find especially problematic when it comes to purportedly
nationally applicable standards and rules)02 Such variation is not
indefensible-and, in fact, may be desirable, even in the
constitutional context-but it may require advocates to stake out
cognizable positions on seemingly unrelated questions, like the
feasibility and appropriateness of theories of localism and popular
constitutionalism.l03 In short, the issues at play are inexorably
complex. But, significantly, they are not insoluble. Academics and
reformers ought to pursue legitimacy-based arguments, but they
ought to take care to ensure that their arguments are sufficiently
theorized before they may effectively invoke perceptions of
legitimacy to resolve controversial public-policy questions.

2.

Fair Adjudication

The legitimacy project could also provide insight into lay
perceptions about procedural rules and standards that regulate
prosecutors and courts. For instance, it might be useful to inquire
into whether laypersons favor inclusion of an actual-innocence
verdict option; whether they are troubled by the lack of a
102. Cf. Allen et al., supra note 59, at 365 ("[D]o we want a body of Fourth
Amendment law in which the very meaning of the search may vary from place
to place?"). Indeed, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court rejected arguments for a
constitutional arrest standard that took into consideration a state specific
arrest rule for misdemeanor cases. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008)
("[L]inking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would cause them to
'vary from place to place and from time to time' . . . . It would be strange
to ... [constitutionally] restrict state officers ... solely because the States have
passed search-and-seizure laws that are the prerogative of independent
sovereigns.").
103. For the leading arguments in favor of localism and popular
constitutionalism, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Richard C. Schragger, The
Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371 (2001). For leading articles
extending some of these ideas to criminal procedure and justice, see generally
Stuntz, supra note 100; Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1745 (2005).
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constitutional claim for actual innocence; or whether they perceive
as fair such things as standing requirements, exhaustion doch·ines,
peremptory challenges, speedy-trial rules, double jeopardy, the
inability of prosecutors to comment on a defendant's exercise of her
right to remain silent, or the inability of jurors to learn of sentencing
consequences pre-verdict. With respect to all of these procedural
rules and standards, social scientists could ask whether there are
disconnects between adjudicative practices and public perceptions of
fairness, and whether any such rifts undermine perceptions of
systemic legitimacy more generally and ultimately deference to law
and legal authorities.
One of the most contentious procedural rules is the exclusionary
rule.104 And, because it is so controversial, it has been the subject of
some promising research into its perceived legitimacy. Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, one study found that an overwhelming
majority of respondents disapproved even of using illegally obtained
evidence for impeachment purposes (a maneuver that the Supreme
Court constitutionally has authorized)_105
More recently,
Kenworthey Bilz found that public perceptions of the rule may be
parsed according to the particular rationale offered for its use. 106
According to Bilz, the public endorses the rule when it is used to
promote the integrity of the criminal justice system, but less so
when it is used to promote deterrence only-a significant finding
that runs counter to the conventional (and almost exclusive) judicial
reliance on the deterrence rationale.l07 Of course, this raises the
question of whether the exclusionary rule serves aggregate systemic
integrity because conceptually the rule can only advance integrity
along one dimension by sacrificing it along another.
Concretely, the exclusionary rule limits the ill-gotten gains of
the state by granting an undeserved windfall to factually guilty
defendants. On one reading, such a tradeoff is no affront to systemic
integrity; it is the price of integrity-the cost of honoring the
presumption of innocence and the corresponding allocation of the
burden of proof to the state. But, significantly, it may not be
perceived as such by the public. The paradox of the exclusionary
rule is that the court must tolerate the illegality of one party or
104. Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental
Examination of the Exclusionary Rule 4--5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with
Northwestern
University
School
of
Law),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1629375.
105. LOCK, supra note 54, at 45 (finding that only 27% of the public approved
of using tainted evidence for impeachment purposes). See also United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26
(1971).
106. Bilz, supra notP. 104.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) ("If ... the
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use
in the instant situation is unwarranted.").
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another: the state that builds a case unlawfully or the guilty
defendant who gets off scot-free. To determine which is the lesser
evil, it would be wise to consider the perceptions of the public. And,
to that end, more empirical study is needed. For instance, social
scientists might inquire whether people consider the exclusionary
rule to be procedurally unfair where (as is almost certainly the case)
it leads to unequal treatment and under-enforcement for reasons
unrelated to desert or factual guilt. Or they might ask a more
nuanced question: whether people believe that crime severity should
factor into decisions of whether the exclusionary rule applies-a
position the Court has steadfastly rejected.10s At a minimum, the
research thus far supports the notion that courts should probably
give more credence (or at least some lip-service) to the expressive
integrity justification for the exclusionary rule, and should perhaps
rely less upon the commonly invoked utilitarian deterrence
justification that the public apparently feels is comparatively less
important.
And the exclusionary rule is not the only procedure designed to
both regulate executive actors and to promote integrity. The same
could be said of, say, speedy triall09 and double jeopardy 11 o rules and
108. Cf. Sergio Herzog, The Relationship Between Public Perceptions of
Crime Seriousness and Support for Plea-Bargaining Practices in Israel: A
.Factorial-Survey Approach, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 122-28 (2008)
(finding that opposition to plea bargaining varied according to severity of charge
and harm). Scholars have questioned whether courts ought to consider crime
severity when applying the exclusionary rule. Allen et al., supra note 59, at 344
("Does the exclusionary rule seem more palatable in cases in which the crime is
substantively questionable? If the nature of the crime ... strengthens the
argument for an exclusionary rule, might a more serious crime offer a reason for
limiting the rule? Why not hold that illegally seized evidence is inadmissibleunless the evidence was seized in a homicide investigation, or an investigation
of terrorist networks?"); see also William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of
Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 434-35 (1995). The same argument
could also be made about other constitutional procedural standards, like
determinations of probable cause. Allen et al., supra note 59, at 434 ("For every
search or arrest where the probable cause standard applies ... the standard
does not vary according to the seriousness of the crime . . . . Why should that be
so? Doesn't the state have a much stronger interest in investigating some
crimes than others? ... Shouldn't [it] matter to the governing Fourth
Amendment standard ... [that a case involves] marijuana, and not a set of
plans to blow up a large public building?"); Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 784-85 (1994) ("[P]robable cause cannot
be a fixed standard. It would make little sense to insist on the same amount of
probability regardless of the imminence of the harm . . . . [R]easonableness
obviously does require different levels of cause in different contexts, and not
always a high probability of success, if, say, we are searching for bombs on
planes."). Analogously, Holmes maintained that the test for cognizable criminal
attempts ought to take account of the severity of the object crime. Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 387-88 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. United
States v. Coplon, 185 F.Zd 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1950).
109. Alfredo Garcia, Speedy Trial Swift Justice: Full-Fledged Right or
"Second-Cla..c;s Citizens?," 31 Sw. L. REV. 31, 50 (1992) (discussing the windfall

2012]

PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE

237

standards, which also provide undeserved windfalls to at least some
guilty defendants. Public perceptions of these rules and standards
may turn on the degree and type of state fault and precisely what
bad acts the defendant is alleged to have done. For example, when
it comes to double jeopardy, the public may be likelier to perceive as
unfair and unjust intentional prosecutorial efforts to file succe.ssive
charges that just pass the formulaic Blockburger test over
unintentional prosecutorial slip-ups that just fail it.ll 1 Likewise,
when it comes to speedy trial, the public may disapprove of
exploitative shorter delays over inadvertent or even negligent longer
ones.ll2 Or it may be that, in each instance, the public perceives
fault to be relatively unimportant to the question of whether the
trial delay or successive prosecution is procedurally just. Again, it
may depend, to a degree, on whether public perceptions of fairness
turn principally on sanctioning (and thereby deterring) abusive
exercises of executive power or on promoting the integ1·ity of the
criminal justice system more generally. In short, there is a lot to
unpack and much room for further study.
Comparatively, researchers have done substantially more work
on public perceptions of bargained dispositions, the dominant
adjudicatory practice in American criminal justice.113 These studies
reveal that most Americans disapprove of plea bargaining-as many
as four-fifths, according to some studies. 114 However, it is unclear
benefit of criminal immunity received by the small number of accused who take
advantage of the failure of courts to provide speedy trials).
llO. Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional
Remedies, 77 WASIL U. L. REV. 713, 801 (1999) (explaining that double jeopardy
can provide the defendant with a windfall from the judge's precipitous acts
when the judge acts irrationally or irresponsibly).
111. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); cf. OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009) (1881) ("(E]ven
a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.").
112. Indeed, the Supreme Court already considers the reason for delay to be
an important (if not paramount) factor in the determination of a constitutional
speedy-trial violation. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656-57 (1992);
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
113. See, e.g., Casper et al., supra note 1, at 493 ("[P]rocedural justice does
appear to be related to the defendants' sense that their treatment by courts has
been satisfactory.").
114. Ronald W. Fagan, Public Support for the Courts: An Examination of
Alternative Explanations, 9 J. CRIM. JUST. 403, 407 (1981) (finding that 82% of
respondents disapproved of plea bargaining); Laura B. Myers, Bringing the
Offender to lleel.· Views of the Criminal Courts, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND
JUSTICE 46, 55 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (finding
that 67% of respondents disapproved of plea bargaining); S'rAT. ANALYSIS CTR.,
DEP'T OF ECON. & CM'l'Y. DE:V., OHIO CI'I'TZEN ATTITUDES: A SURVEY OF PUBLIC
OPINION ON CRIME 7 (Jeffrey Knowles ed., 1979) (finding that 67% of
respondents disagreed with the statement that prosecutors should be able to
reduce felony charges to misdemeanor charges in exchange for guilty pleas),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffi1es1/Digitizationf77338NCJRS.pdf; WIS.
POLICY RESEARCH lNST., REPORT: WISCONSIN CITIZEN SURVE:Y 68 (1988) (finding
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whether these negative public perceptions of the practice are
products of procedural or substantive objections-that is, whether
the public disapproves of the lack of trials and attendant formal
process and transparency (legitimacy objections) or of the perceived
lenient,
harsh,
or unequal
outcomes
(distributive-juslice
objections).115
By contrast, practitioners overwhelmingly and
predictably approve of plea bargaining as a necessary tool to
efficiently manage high caseloads. 11 6 Somewhat more surprising are
studies that have found that defendants may approve of bargaining
and may derive similar, or even greater, satisfaction following pleas
than trials. 11 7 The reasons are unclear. It may be that defendants
appreciate the ab-ility to exercise some dominion over their own
fates-a kind of "process control" that "may foster a greater sense of
participation." 11 8 It may be that the very informality of the plea

that 72% of respondents disapproved of plea bargaining), available at
http:/lwww.wpri.org/ReportsNolume%201Nollnol.pdf; see also Michael M.
O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 445 (2008)
("Public opinion surveys consistently find low approval rates of plea
bargaining.").
115. See Robert F. Rich & Roberl J. Sampson, Public Perceptions of Criminal
Justice Policy: Does Victimization Make a Difference?, G VIOLENCE & VICTIMS
109, 113-14 (1990) (indicating that across socio-demographic groups,
individuals disapprove of plea bargaining because the practice results in lenient
sentences); see also Stanley A Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to
Plea BargaZ:ning, .12 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 102 (1989) (discussing a Canadian study
tracing opposition to plea bargaining to perceived leniency).
116. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROC8SS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER ClllMINAL COURT 185-86 (1979); MILTON HF.UMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PHOSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS 157-62 (1978).
117. JONATHAN D. CASPER, CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE
51 (1978) ("One of the peculiar differences between trial and plea defendants is
the greater propensity of those who have had trials to complain that they have
not had the chance to present their side of the case."); Casper et al., supra note
1, at 496-9R ("Finally, whether the defendant was convicted by a plea or a trial
is unrelated to a sense of procedural justice .... Those who plead guilty do not
report having received less procedural fairness than those whose conviction was
produced by triaL").
llS. CASPER, supra note 117, at 51; see E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R TYLF.R, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCF;DURAL JUSTICE 106 (1988) ("The perception that
one has had an opportunity to express oneself and to have one's views
considered by someone in power plays a critical role in fairness judgments.");
TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 163 (observing that "an opportunity Lo take part
in the decision-making process" contributes significantly to perceptions that
procedures are fair); E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control and Procedural Justice:
Instrumental and Noninstrumental Value Concerns in ~Fairness Judgments, 59
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 (1990) ("Research has suggested that
the opportunity for participation may be important to individuals even when
their participation is unlikely to affect the decision. This suggests that on some
occasions, even non-meaningful voice may lead individuals to assess a process
as more fair."); Tom R. Tyler eL al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with
Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
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process makes it more comprehensible to defendants than
professionally dominated and highly technical rule-bound trials.ll9
It may be that defendants appreciate the certainty of guilty pleas or
(like practitioners) the efficiency of avoiding the process costs of
trials. 120 Or it may be Lhat defendants are more satisfied with
sentencing outcomes after pleas than trials.
Plainly, there is much more to explore concerning lay
perceptions of plea bargaining and whether and to what degree
those perceptions are shaped by procedural practices, as opposed to
substantive results. Additionally, there are a number of corollary or
subsidiary bargaining practices that have received almost no
attention at all. For instance, it is unclear what laypersons think of
arguably strained judici::d constructions of "voluntariness" in the
plea-bargaining contcxt.l 21 Likewise, it is unclear what laypersons
think of so-called Alford pleas-equivocal pleas in which defendants
accept guilt while protesting innocence.l22 And it is also unclear
what laypersons think of other nontraditional pleas, like cooperation
agreements. 123
Under cooperation agreements, cooperating
defendants are ultimately punished not according to desert, but
according to the crime-control value of the help that they provide to
legal authorities. 121 Indeed, some of the most culpable defendants
may receive the most significant discounts because they have the
most information to sell. These utilitarian bargains may serve

PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985); see also supra notes 110 and infra notes 140-43, 208
and accompanying text.
119. Cf Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation. in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 920-22 (2006) (discussing complexity and lack
of transparency of modern trials); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short
History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & Soc'Y Rr~V. 261, 262-65 (1979) (describing
simplicity of pre-modern jury trials).
120. FEELEY, supra note 116, at 185-86; HEUMJ\NN, supra note 116, at 70
(indicating that many defendants just want to "get it over with"); Josh Bowers,
Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. HEV. 1117, 1132-39 (2008).
121. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (presuming that a
defendant advised by competent counsel is capable of making an intelligent
decision of whether to accept or reject a plea agreement); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970) (stating whether or not a plea is voluntary
depends on all of surrounding circumstances).
122. Cf Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values
and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford und Nolo Contendere Pleas, ,88
CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1388 (2003) (d.isc:ussing an informal poll of law students
to gauge perceptions of Alford pleas).
123. See, e.g., STAT. ANALYSIS CTR., supra note 114, at 7 (finding that 53.4%
of respondents disagreed with the statement that prosecutors should be
permitted to trade charge reduction for testimony).
124. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 292, 292 (1996).
Contra Frank 0. Bowman, Defending Substantial Assistance: An Old
Prosecutor's Meditation on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfield-Kramer
Report, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 45, 45 (1999).
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instrumental goals, t25 but only at retributive costs that the public
may perceive to be unfair and unjust.l26 Finally, it is unclear what
laypersons think of reforms intended to provide victims with more
s-ignificant roles in plea bargaining and adjudication generally.12 7
B.

Creating Moral Credibility
Studies confirm that laypeople think of criminal liability and
punishment in terms of desert-the moral blameworthiness of the
offender-and not in terms of other principles, such as general
deterrence and incapacitation, which have been so popular with
system designers during the past several decades.l28 Thus, people
naturally expect that a criminal justice system will distribute
criminal liability and punishment so as to do justice.
However, studies have shown that current liability and
punishment rules commonly undermine the criminal law's
reputation for doing justice. One recent study showed that a wide
range of modern crime-control doctrines treat cases in ways that
dramatically conflict with laypeople's intuitions of justice.129 The
125. llonald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance
Departures: Valuable Tool or Dangerous Weapon?, 12 FED. SEN'l''G HEP. 41, ·11

(1999) (crediting cooperation agreements with breaking up drug gangs in
Chicago).
126. Snitch (PBS television documentary broadcast Jan. lL., 1999). Social
scientists could also ask legitimacy questions about discrete facets of the plea
process. For instance, it is unclear what laypersons think of the somewhat open
constitutional question of whether prosecutors must disclose exculpatory
evidence to defendants prior to plea. A number of lower courts have held that
prosecutors must. See, e.g., United SLates v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir.
1998). However, the Supreme Court's holding that prosecutors need not
disclose impeachment evidence prior to plea indicates that in the future it may
hold likPwise as to exculpatory evidence. United States v. Rui~, 536 U.S. 622,
629 (2002).
127. There is some inclication-again, consistent with the nexus identified
between "process control" and perceptions of fair procedure-that victims
perceive as legitimate procedures in which they play roles, even if they do not
ultimately affect outcomes. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; infra
note 229 and accompanying text. Indeed, Stephanos Bibas reported that three·
quarters of victims considered it "very important" to be able to weigh in on
decisions about charge dismissals, plea negotiations, sentencing, and parole
proceedings. Bibas, supra note 119, at 929 ("Participating makes victims feel
empowered and helps them to heal emotionally. More generally, citizens report
that participating in the legal system increases their respect for the system and
empowers them."); see also Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing
the Harm: Victims and Restoratiue Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 21 (2003)
(noting that participation empowers victims and promotes healing and closure).
128. See, e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Dar1ey, Psychological Aspects
of Retributive Justice, 40 .ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 193, 233-35
(2008); Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just
Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 284, 295
(2002); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for
Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000).
129. See Robinson et al., supra note 3, at 1949-79.
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conflict exists for such standard doctrines as "three strikes" and
other habitual offender statutes, high penalties for drug offenses,
adult prosecution of juveniles, abolition or narrowing of the insanity
defense, strict liability, felony murder, and criminalization of
regulatory violations. The conflicts were shown to undermine the
criminal law's moral credibility with the subjectsJ30 Previous
studies had results consistent with those results.1~1
It appears, then, that to build moral credibility, the criminal
law must avoid conflict with the community's principles of justice.
While there is still much work to be done, current research tells us
something about community views on a wide variety of criminal law
issues, including studies on: objective requirements of attempt;
creating a criminal risk; objective requirements of complicity;
omission liability; use of deadly force in self-defense; use of force in
defense of property; citizens' law enforcement authority; mistake or
accident defenses; culpability requirements generally; culpability
requirements
for
complicity;
voluntary
intoxication;
individualization of the objective standard of negligence, insanity,
immaturity, and involuntary intoxication; duress and entrapment
defenses; felony murder; causation requirements; and punishment
for multiple offenses.l 32 Other studies have examined lay intuitions
on whether guilt should be determined according to objectivist or
subjectivist views of criminality,l33 on competing theories of
blackmai},l34 on offense grading distinctions,135 and on competing
theories of justification.l36
The studies make clear that current criminal law regularly
deviates from the community's justice judgments. And with each
instance, the law risks undermining its moral credibility with the
community. While many of the deviations are sufficiently minor to
have little impact on their own, the cumulative effect of the many
deviations can have a substantial practical impact, as Part III

130. See id. at 1994-2025.
131. See text accompanying notes 179-95, infra.
132. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIA13ILITY,
AND BLAME: COJ\1MUNITY Vmws AND THE CRIMINAL LAw STUDIES (1995)
[hereinafter JLB] (reporting study results).
133. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Objectivist Versus Subjectivist
Views of Criminality: A Study in the Role of Social Science in Criminal Law
Theory, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 409 (1998).
134. See Paul H. Robinson et al., Competing Theories of Blackmail: An
Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291
(2010).
135. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American
Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 709 (2010).
136. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of
Justification, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1095 (1998).
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discusses.
Consider this summary of studies, as reported by
Robinson and Darley.137
The studies report many sources of law-community conflict in
relation to the criminal law's secondary prohibitions, such as
inchoate offenses, omission liability, and complicity liability.13S
Modern American criminal codes commonly would impose liability
where laypersons would not, or would impose considerably less.
Consider a variety of examples of such conflicts. Subjects found the
dangerous proximity test embodied in the common law a more
proper test for attempt liability than the substantial step test of the
Model Penal Code ("Code"), upon which most modern American
criminal codes are based.l39
Subjects gave more weight to
renunciation of a criminal attempt even when that attempt had
progressed far enough to trigger liability.l 4 0 The respondents
believed that unsuccessful attempts to assist in a crime called for
little or no liability, 141 which is more consistent with the common
law rule than the Code's treatment, which imposes full offense
liability. 142 Subjects gave a person who intends murder, but creates
only a slight risk of causing a slight harm, a sentence greatly
reduced from the Code's treatment of the act as attempted
murder. 14 3 Subjects did not give an accomplice to crime the level of
liability equal to that they assigned to the principal, contrary to the
Code's approach.l44 Finally, subjects found a person who failed in
his or her duty to rescue a person from death to be somewhat
culpable but not for murder, again in conflict with the Code.l 4 5
The conflicts moved in the other direction as well, with
respondents imposing greater liability than that imposed by modern
codes, or assigning liability in cases in which the codes do not. For
example, subjects assigned liability to individuals who develop a
settled intention to commit a crime, even though modern codes
assign none unless that intention is translated into action.l 46
Likewise, respondents imposed some liability on persons who failed
to assist a person in distress, although modern American codes
typically do not.147
These points of conflict are really just symptoms of conflicts in
broad perspective between laypersons and the Code. Note that
respondents consistently assigned reduced liabilities to individuals
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

JLB, supra note 132.
For a fuller discussion, see id. at ch. 2.
Jd. at 50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
Id. at 50-51.
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who play secondary roles in the commission of a crime, even though
the Code assigns them liabilities equivalent to the principal. Also,
subjects assigned reduced liability for the violation of secondary
prohibitions (such as attempt), even though the Code assigns
liabilities equivalent to those assigned for the substantive offense.
That is, the results suggest that the community is more "harmoriented" than is the Code, at least in grading the seriousness of
wrongdoing. 148
The criminal law's justification defenses show a variety of
points of conflict with community views.l49 The subjects considered
the justifications to be more compelling than the modern legal codes
in a variety of instances. When force is used in self-defense, in
defense of property, or to apprehend a fleeing offender, respondents
frequently assigned no liability in cases to which the Code did.150
Even when respondents assigned liability, they typically would
grade the violation as considerably lower than would the Code.l51
The differences between community standards and criminal codes
becomes apparent when studies examine what people think is
justifiable in defense of property, and even more apparent in the
cases involving a citizen who uses force to apprehend a criminal
fleeing a crime or to apprehend a person thought to be a criminal
fleeing a crime. The respondents were willing to tolerate the use of
more force than the Code permits, and assigned lesser sanctions to
defendants for the use of force even in the instances in which they
felt that some blame ought to accrue.I 52
Studies of the culpability requirements for offenses revealed
several points of conflict between community views and criminal
law.l53 For example, there is a general approval of the law's
tendency to make a major differentiation between reckless and
negligent commission of an offense. Subjects imposed significantly
different liability assignments depending on whether the individual
was reckless with respect to the various elements specified as
relevant by modern codes, or merely negligent. 1 54 Most codes assign
no higher liability for an offense (other than homicide) committed
knowingly or purposefully than one committed recklessly. Subjects,
in contrast, assigned higher liability for higher culpability than
recklessness.I55 Subjects also distinguished recklessly committed
offenses from negligently committed ones, but unlike the general
code treatment, sometimes assigned significant liability even for

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Robinson & Darley, supra note 133, at 413.
For a fuller discussion, see JLB, supra note 132, at ch. 3.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
Id.
For a fuller discussion, see id. at ch. 4.
Id. at 123.
ld. at 123-24.
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negligently committed offenses_156 In general, to accurately reflect
communal judgments, drafters should redraft codes to have liability
vary with the culpability level of the offender.
A similar result emerged when studies examined the culpability
requirements for complicity. The codes set purposefulness as to
assisting the principal as the minimum requirement for complicity,
but respondents were willing to assign liability to a person who
knowingly, or even recklessly, assists.
Respondents assigned
different and lower levels of liability as the culpability level
decreased, which again suggests that the community would prefer
differences in grading based upon differences in culpability.l5 7
The voluntary intoxication studies found a pattern of judgments
that was broadly consistent with the legal treatment of the cases.
Specifically, "codes commonly use negligence as the trigger point for
the attribution of liability, and so do subjects, thus supporting the
codes' adoption of that standard rather than one triggered by a
higher degree of culpability."t58
However, respondents were
considerably influenced by the degree of pre-intoxication culpability
that the person had with respect to commission of the offense, while
the codes typically do not consider that factor.l59
A person is negligent if he or she disregards possible risks that
a reasonable or prudent individual would consider. "Traditionally
codes have treated this as an objective standard, not to be varied as
a function of, for instance, the lower intelligence of the person whose
conduct is being judged."l60 However, some modern codes have
partially individualized the standard, directing the decision maker
to take account of some personal characteristics of the offendcr. 16 1
There is no developed theory of which factors should be taken into
account; "[i]nstead, judges (and, to a lesser extent, juries) are
allowed to determine which attributes should be considered."162 A
study seeking to discover which attributes subjects considered to be
appropriate for individualization of the reasonable person standard
gave complex results: it found both lowered and raised standards. 16 3
This suggests that the modern trend toward individualizing the
objective reasonable person standard has support among the
community. But the absence of an obvious principle tends to
confirm the practical need for some greater guidance on the issue.

156. Id. at 124.
157. Id.
158. ld. at 124; see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(5)(b) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (fixing negligence as the minimum culpability requirement for
intoxication).
159. JLB, supra note 132, at 124.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 124-25.
163. Id. at 125.
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Leaving judges to decide ad hoc, as is now the case, is not likely to
generate results consistent with community views.
The studies show that systematic conflict with the comr~unity
also exists within doctrines of excuse_164
While the subjects
recognized mental incapacity as a valid basis for exculpation, they
preferred formulations of the insanity defense that recognize both a
control and cognitive deficit; respondents seem to conclude that
dysfunction of either type is a valid trigger for exculpation.l65 Yet a
majority of state codes recognize cognitive dysfunction but not
control dysfunction as a basis for the defense.l 6 G
The studies recognized duress scenarios as providing at least a
mitigation of liability; the degree of mitigation is a function of the
respondent's perception of the degree of coercion in the particular
situationJ67 Codes instead set a single cut-off standard in which the
offender either gets a full defense or full liability. Respondents used
similar considerations to evaluate entrapment cases, rejecting as
unimportant the Code's formulation of the defense, which requires
that it be given only when a police agent supplies the inducement
that leads the person to commit the crime. 168 This suggests that
they would be happy to have the entrapment defense disappear as a
separate defense, and be subsumed under the duress defense.l 69
Studies found that respondents' intuitions about the
appropriate grading for different variants of offenses differ from
those reflected in the modern legal codes.1 70
For example,
respondents regarded forcible rapes as similar in grade irrespective
of the parties' prior relationship, while the Code varies the offense
grade by prior relationship.l7 1 With regard to felony murder,
respondents preferred what might be termed a "felonymanslaughter rule" (with a standard "accomplice discount") rather
than the modern approach that extends murder liability to all
participants.l72
It is clear that respondents agreed with the general tendency in
modern legal codes to distinguish grades of offenses within as well
as between offenses, and typically favored additional grading
distinctions not made by the Code. For example, in causation
studies, subjects graded various causal contributions to a death
differently, assigning less liability to persons who intended to kill
but did not succeed in directly doing so, although death later occ..:urs
164.
165.
166.
2011).
167.
168.
169.
170.

For a fuller discussion, see id. at ch. 5.

Id. at 155.
See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW 369 (2d ed.
JLB, supra note 132, at 155.

Id.
Id.
For further discussion, see id. at ch. 6.

Id. at 197.
172. Id.

171.
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in some more indirect way.l73 The subjects' interest in more specific
grading also is similar to their conflict with the tendency of modern
codes toward dichotomous judgments as compared to the
respondents' more continuous judgments. As noted above, they see
the degree of contribution in complicity, or how far the offender has
progressed in an attempt, or the strength of the causal connection in
homicide cases as grounds for adjusting liability along a continuum,
as opposed to the law's judgment to set a fixed point on the
continuum that will judge the conduct to be either complicity or not,
an attempt or not, full causal accountability or none.
The problems of sentencing for multiple offenses also suggest a
structural change in current law. Presently, multiple offenses
typically are dealt with either by concurrent sentences, which
impose no additional sentence for a second offense, or by a
consecutive sentence, which effectively doubles the penalty.
Respondents, in contrast, assigned sentences for a second offense
that added to but did not double the sentence for the first offense,
and continued this pattern for further offenses. Their approach
matches that of the United States Sentencing Commission
guidelines.1 74 If the law were to better reflect community views,
that approach would be more widely adopted.

C.

The Problem of Perception

Perceptions mediate the normative force of procedural fairness
and empirical desert, but perceptions, of course, may be wrong. By
way of historical example, trials by ordeal and other irrational
modes of adjudication were probably considered legitimate during
the early Middle Ages, even though they almost certainly were
not.17 5
In other words, the legitimacy project for its part does not
actually demand that procedures be fair, only that they appear to
be. And the moral credibility project for its part does not actually
require that substantive rules produce just 1·esults, in a
transcendent sense, only that they reflect people's shared moral
intuitions. An element of relativism thereby creeps in: there may be
moral truth about the distributive justice of a given rule or the
fairness of a given procedure, but popular perceptions of fairness and
justice may be otherwise. 1 7S In this way, the emphasis on perception
173. Id. at 198.
174. Id. at 199.
175. See generally Rebecca V. Colman, Reason and Unreason in Early
Medieval Law, 4 J. lNTERDISC. HIST. 571 (1974) (discussing the importance of
trial by ordeal as divine judgment); Ian C. Pilarczyk, Between a Rock and a Hot

Place: The Role of Subjectivity and Rationality in the Medieval Ordeal by Hot
Iron, 25 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 87, 87-92, 106-112 (1996) (describing the procedure
of the ordeal and finding it well suited to the Middle Ages).
176. AB Tyler and Wakslak recognized in their study of the legitimacy of
police profiling:
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raises three potential problems. First, a fair procedure or just rule
may be misconstrued as unfair or unjust (false negatives). Second,
an unfair procedure or unjust rule may be misconstrued as fair or
just (false positives). Finally, a questionable but nontransparent
procedure or rule may not be perceived at all.
To some extent, these concerns may be beside the point for
present purposes, as our principal focus is whether, when, and how
perceptions of fairness and justice facilitate effective crime controlthat is, our focus is on the implications of perceptions, as opposed to
their truth. In any event, one of us is highly skeptical whether
deontological facts are operationalizable.I7 7 Assuming there are
moral absolutes (a big assumption), we believe that tapping lay
perceptions is the best (albeit imperfect) way to come closest to
discovering them. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge the potential
for lay perceptions to fall short of the mark. This is a particular
concern when it comes to perceptions of procedural fairness because
they are more likely to be malleable cultural constructs and are
therefore less likely to accurately reflect some higher truth.1 78
Tn an effort to not sell short the objections, we think it
appropriate to say a bit more about each potential problem of
perception-that is, false negatives, false positives, and
nontransparency. First, as to false negatives, we concede the
inevitability of the problem. Even a credible and just government
may commit some salient misstep, and such a blunder may trigger a
pernicious spillover effect that leads citizens to misperceive as
unfair or unjust even normatively defensible governmental actions,
standards, or rules. 17 9 These misperceptions could thereafter lead to
a loss of deference-for instance, the nullification of a justifiable
prosecution or the violation of a justifiable law. Some scholars have
posited that this is precisely what happened domestically during the
Vietnam conflict: frustrations with the government's foreign policies
contributed to the counterculture's perception that the nation's drug
laws were simjlarly unjust)SO

The quality of interpersonal treatment is not necessarily an indicator
of the manner in which police make decision1:>. We can imagine an
officer who is not a neutral decision maker, but still treats people with
dignity and respect. At the same time we can imagine an oflicer who
is a neutral decision maker, but treats people without dignity and
respect. Yet people do not treat these two issues as distinct.
Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 277.
177. Robinson, supra note 19, at 1838.
178. It is not, however, a concern exclusive to perceptions of procedural
justice, as indicated by previous generations' misguided moral convictions
concerning the perceived inferiority of racial minorities.
179. Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of
Moral Violations on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1239
(2008).
180. C{. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 4.
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Second, the reverse-false positives-may also exist. Under
some circumstances, the most problematic forms of racial profiling
may implic~te the danger. Specifically, consider the example of an
officer who stops and searches an in.dividual after drawing
unwarranted inferences of culpability based solely on skin color.
Imagine further that the officer employs a soft tone and exhibits a
gentle demeanor.
For obvious reasons, courteousness is
commendable, but the fear is that the officer may use polite words
and kind manner to manipulate the subtler aspects of police-citizen
interactions to create a false perception that she is not engaged in
racial profiling, even when she is.l8 1 In short, one set of legitimate
practices may mask others that potentially are illegitimate. Put
differently, police may play professional and unprofessional
practices off of one another. As Tyler and Wakslak found:
[P]olice behavior shapes the attributions people make ....
Those who believe that the police are neutral are less likely to
Those who experience high quality
feel profiled... .
interpersonal treatment-politeness, respect, acknowledgment
of their rights-are also less likely to feel that they have been
profiled.1s2
This tendency of people to confuse respectful policing for
unbiased policing may be good for police and even for public safety,
particularly if profiling is a somewhat intractable product of
unconscious motivation, but it is not categorically good to the degree
we are committed to more than just normative crime control-to the
degree we care also about the fairness and equity of police
procedures in reality.
This is not to say that police should succumb to rude or abrasive
impulses. It is desirable for police to be courteous, but not when
civility is window dressing; it is desirable for police to give reasons
for actions, but not when reasons are pretexts. It is, therefore,
somewhat chilling that certain legitimacy advocates endorse steps
like "mitigat[ing] by courteous behavior and an explanation" stops of
people who "have done nothing wrong."183 Such advice amounts to
the perceptual tail wagging the dog. If police stop people for doing
nothing wrong, we should look for feasible ways to minimize that
practice, not to merely change public perceptions of it. We should
want normatively troubling police conduct exposed, not hidden.
Moreover, in this context, false perceptions of procedural fairness

181. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 253 ("[T]he fairness with which the
police exercise their authority influences whether members of the public view
the police as profiling.").
182. Id. at 259.
183. Heather Mac Donald, Face Facts on Frisks, N.Y. Po~T (May 19, 2009,
3:1 fi
AM),
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinionfopedcolumnists/item
_EB3eFdXwYOuojyH5PeJHhi.
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may prove particularly harmful because perceptions of fairness
(unlike moral intuitions) would seem to be more often culturally
constructed and accordingly potentially polarizing. Specifically, a
social group that has grown accustomed to inordinate police stops
may perceive racial profiling where another group perceives polite
policing.I84 No matter who is right in a given case, the consequences
are divisive.
But what if the public is aware of racial profiling yet approves of
it? As indicated, we think (but do not know definitively) that this is
not the case. We believe that the public shares the Court's
perspective that racial discrimination demands a special
justification-what the Court refers to as strict scrutiny. 185 Indeed,
we suspect that it is precisely for this reason that police are so
unwilling to acknowledge racial profiling. That is, police recognize
that the public typically perceives the practice to be illegitimate,
even if it is sometimes (or even typically) instrumentally effective.
But, as indicated, perceptions are elastic and may change over
time.l8 6 For instance, in the wake of, say, future terrorist attacks or
immigration crises, a majority may come to more firmly tolerate or
even welcome profiling. 187
In such circumstances, popular
considerations of systemic legitimacy may fail adequately to
constrain excessive state power. On this reading, approval of racial
profiling could describe a false positive in the face of more pressing
antisubordination and countermajoritarian principles. In this way,
genuine invidious practices may illustrate the outer-bounds of
normative theories that permit popular intuition to shape criminal
justice policy.
There are examples of adjudicative false positives as well. For
instance, a defense attorney may successfully push an ill-advised
and self-serving plea deal on her client simply by communicating
persuasively and politely and thereby cloaking self-dealing in a
professional facade. 1811
By way of further example, several
academics have recommended reforms (which we endorse) intended
to grant crime victims greater opportunity to be heard,189 But there
184. Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 15, at 267-68.
185. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995).
186. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
187. Huq et al., supra note 93, at 419 ("People have normative and political
judgments about terror that diverge from their judgments about crime."); see
also supra note 89 and accompanying text. .
188. Casper et al., supra note 1, at 498 (finding significant correlation
between defendant perceptions of legitimacy and time spent discussing case
with lawyer). The problem with this is akin to the sick patient who gives high
marks to the substandard doctor with exemplary bedside manner but pursues a
malpractice suit against the brusque doctor with superior medical skill.
189. See, e.g., Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights:
Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 350-53 (advocating the
passage of the federal Crime Victims' Rights Amendment to provide additional
trial rights and protections to the victims of crimes).
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are sound reasons-most notably, efficiency and equal
treatmentl 90-to provide victims with only a "voice" and not with
guarantees of "decision controL"1 9 1 From the standpoint of the
legitimacy project, this is not a problem: "voice" procedures enhance
perceptions of legitimacy, irrespective of whether the voices are
heeded. 192 Concretely, "process control" is all that matters-that is,
the ability to shape the manner in which information is conveyed to
the decision maker .193 But when an adjudicative procedure has no
potential to affect outcome, the perception that it is fair may be
chimerical. The argument here is that such a procedure does little
more than exploit the cognitive biases that lead people to believe
that merely by participating they can affect uncontrollable events.l9 4
Of course, a ready response to this is that victim impact statements
and similar reforms do, in fact, have at least the capacity (albeit not
the authority) to affect adjudicatory decisions. But we should at
least be cognizant of the concern that a preference for "process
control" may create opportunities for legal authorities to package
procedures and practices in perceptually appealing ways, even if the
packages are empty in fact. 195 Put simply, seemingly fair and just
procedures may just serve institutional ends at the expense of
fairness and justice.
Another false positive may be found in the administration of
juvenile justice in the years before the Court's influential decision in
In re Gault, which extended many constitutional procedural rights
to respondents in delinquency hearings. 1 96 Significantly, the Court
noted that juvenile courts had come to adopt arbitrary and unfair
procedures by propagating a hollow perception of the proceeding as
"one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of

190. A concern that implicates legitimacy in its own right.
191. See generally infra Part IV (exploring good-faith reasons to deviate from
perceptions of fair procedures and practices).
192. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 1, at 77, 119-22.
193. Folger, supra note 16; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
194. For instance, studies have shown that even though individuals lack
control over random dice rolls, they are willing to pay a premium to bet on their
own future dice rolls over guesses at the past rolls of others. Chip Heath &
Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief· Ambiguity and Competence in Choice
Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 8 (1991).
195. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, there may be no there, there. GERTRUDE
STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1937). Indeed, one study found that even
strong victims' rights laws had no discernible impact on plea negotiations and
guilty pleas beyond keeping victims aware of the substance and timing of court
proceedings. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRtMINAL PROCEDURES 1161
(3d ed. 2007). This finding is consistent with Susan Bandes' observation that
prosecutors resist reforms that interfere with their agenda. Susan Bandes,
Victim Standing, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 331, 333 (1999).
196. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice
and admonition."197
At a macro-level, the greatest risk of false positives undoubtedly
arises out of corrupt governments that are erroneously perceived to
be fair and just.
An unjust society will perceive its unjust
procedures and rules to be just-even where these procedures and
rules merely reproduce that society's backward worldview. Put
differently, bankrupt intuitions may do nothing to check bankrupt
institutions. To the extent that people buy into the illogic and
injustice of, say, a fascist or racist system-such as Nazi Germany
or the Jim Crow South-levels of deference remain unaffected (at
least among the unsubordinated classes).
Do the dangers of false negatives and positives mean that we
should abandon empirical desert and legitimacy? Not at all. In the
first instance, people's intuitions are probably right far more often
than they are wrong. In any event, the fact that perceptions may be
wrong weighs in favor of pursuing both projects in an effort to
increase the likelihood that they will not only foster normative crime
control but that they will check each other's work. Ideally, citizens
may come to reject a corrupt regime's procedures as illegitimate,
even if they erroneously perceive its liability and punishment rules
to be just. Or they may come to reject its rules as unjust even if they
erroneously perceive its means to be fair. This underscores an
intriguing fact: perfect deference may be undesirable because it is
through disobedience and not deference that the legitimacy and
moral credibility of the state are testedJ9 8 Instances of lawlessness
force the unjust state to advertise its immorality and injustice, and
they provide the just state with opportunities to demonstrate the
normative worth of its rules and institutions.
Third, and finally, legitimacy and moral credibility have no
normative force if the public fails to even perceive the rule or
procedure in question. This is less of a concern with liability and
punishment rules than with policing and adjudicatory procedures
because substantive rules tend to be more transparent than
procedures. 199 And this is less of a concern with policing than with
adjudication because people have more contact with police than
courts. Still, there are concerns. For example, we have raised a
number of potentially illegitimate, low-visibility procedures,
standards, and rules-statutes of limitations, the exclusionary rule,
standing requirements, speedy-trial rules, exhaustion doctrines,

197. Id. at 26 (observing that due process must honor not just "the
appearance" but also "the actuality of fairness, impartiality, and orderliness").
198. Nicholas A. Curott & Alexander Fink, Bandit Heroes: Social, Mythical,
or Rational?, AM. J. ECON. & Soc. (forthcoming) ("[B]anditry provides a system
of checks and balances on state power.").
199. Cf Bibas, supra note 119 (exploring lack of transparency in
adjudicative procedures).
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peremptory challenges, and Alford pleas. But, ultimately, any
arguments about the normative authority of empirical desert and
procedural fairness with respect to these procedures, standards, and
rules must be tempered by the fact that the general public may not
even be aware that they exist.

III. PRODUCING DEFERENCE
Certainly, fairness and justice are worthwhile independent of
their consequences, but these values are all the more desirable if
they also facilitate effective crime control.
Does a system's
reputation for being fair and doing justice make the system more
successful at fighting crime? What evidence exists to support claims
of such positive practical effects?
A.

The Effects of Undermining Legitimacy
The advantages of producing deference are obvious, and
legitimacy is a particularly appealing mechanism to achieve the
objective because perceptions of legitimacy possess the potential to
produce deference broadly.
A populace that finds its legal
authorities and institutions to be legitimate ought to be likelier to
acquiesce to even those rules and enforcement measures that fail to
generate categorical (or even very much) support.
The bulk of studies drawing this link between perceptions of
legitimacy and deference have examined the question through the
lens of police practices. For example, Tyler has found that racial
profiling affects compliance among minorities, but not among
whites, who are less likely to perceive the practice.zoo Another study
found that even garden-variety police unprofessionalism may affect
deference. Specifically, John McCluskey found that police are more
likely to generate compliance when they interact with individuals
courteously and patiently.20l Likewise, McCulskey linked forceful
entry tactics with noncompliance and noncooperation-an important
finding that calls into question the efficacy of hard-nosed police
tactics such as "blue swarming," in which police use strength in
numbers to compel compliance, rather than politely soliciting
cooperation through even-toned requests. 2 02
200. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
201. McCLUSKEY, supra note 17, at 171 ("As police seek more information
from citizens they become more likely to comply. Police respect enhances
compliance, and police disrespect diminishes compliance.").
202. Id. at 43 ("[T]he method of entry is an important factor in determining
the outcome of police"citizcn encounters .... [F]orceful entry tactics were
significant predictors of noncompliance." (citation omitted)); Stephen D.
Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public's Response to Specific
Police Requests, 33 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 269, 290 (1996) (noting that a
friendly approach "was significantly more likely to produce a compliant
response than a forceful entry, but otherwise there appears to be no particular
stylistic tendency that accounts for the greater success of experienced and pro·
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These and other studies provide robust support for the null
hypothesis that perceptions of legitimacy do, in fact, correlate with
higher levels of cooperation and lower rates of recidivism.2os But
questions of causation remain open, and confounding variables may
exist. For instance, in Tyler's seminal study, subjects were asked to
self-report both their perceptions of the criminal justice system and
their commission of petty offenses.20 4 From the results, Tyler
inferred a link between perception and compliance.2° 5 The inference
is no doubt strong, but, of course, it could be that law-abiding
respondents are likelier to perceive the criminal justice system to be
fair. Or it could be that the respondents with less faith in the
criminal justice system were more willing to self-report violations,
but not necessarily likelier to commit them. Tyler mitigated these
concerns by using a longitudinal study design that measures
deference at two points (as compared to a cross-sectional study that
would have provided only a snapshot in time), but the concerns,
nonetheless, remain.206
A separate study similarly found that individuals were less
likely to recidivate if they perceived their arrests to be legitirnate.207
But, as stated before, it could be that people who perceive arrests to
be legitimate are also people for whom misconduct is aberrational.
Again, the causal arrows may flow the other way: subjective
perceptions of legitimacy may be produced by moral commitment to
law and legal authorities-not vice versa. 208 Or it could be that
police officers act differently toward agreeable suspects (those who
community policing officers"); id. at 295 ("That the number of officers present
decreases the probability of compliance is striking given that shows of force by
'blue swarming' are specifically intended to secure compliance with minimum
resistance."); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
203. TYLER, WPOL, supra note t; Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair
Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31 LAw
& Soc'y REv. 163, 170 (1997); Reisig et al., supra note 11, at 1024; Michael D.
Reisig, John D. McCluskey, Stephen D. Mastrofski & William Terrill, Suspect
Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JUST. Q. 241 (2004); Michael D. Reisig &
Gorazd Mesko, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Prisoner Misconduct, 15
PSYCHOL. CRlME & L. 41, 41-49 (2009); Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 1; Tyler &
Fagan, supra note 1.
204. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1; see also Reisig ct al., supra note 12, at
1024 (finding that study "participants with higher legitimacy scores reported
higher levels of compl-iance with the law").
205. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1.
206. I d.; Tyler & Fagan, supra note 1 (using similar methodology to find link
between legitimacy and cooperation). In a later study, Tyler further mitigated
the problems of self-reporting by using police reports as the dependent variable.
Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism:

The Engagement of Offenders' Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE
Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW & Soc'y REV. 553 (2007).
207. See generally Paternoster et al., supra note 197.
20S. Paternoster controlled for internal attributes in some ways but not
others.
For instance, he asked whether respondents were members of
community or religious organizations. ld. at 178.
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exhibit decency, contrition, or congeniality), and these suspects
thereafter perceive their interactions with police to be legitimate. If
these internal attributes correlate with deference to law and legal
authorities, then fair treatment may be incidental to recidivism
rates.
Additionally, some commentators have highlighted high rates of
acquittal in certain poor and minority communities-the so-called
"Bronx Jury" phenomenon-as evidence that negative systemic
perceptions translate to diminished willingness to cooperate with
legal authorities.209 But higher acquittal rates do not necessarily
represent lawless jury nullification; they may simply reflect goodfaith application of a legally defensible (albeit distinct) culturally
constructed conception of what constitutes proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. 21 0 And even if historically disadvantaged groups
do, in fact, nullify at higher rates, uncooperative juror conduct may
not be motivated by perceptions of procedural unfairness; it could be
a product of perceptions of substantive injustice or something else
entirely. 211
Finally, as indicated, with respect to order-maintenance
policing, academics claim (with fair intuitive support) that heavyhanded police tactics have engendered backlash in some
predominately poor and minority neighborhoods. 21 2 Yet crime rates
have dropped dramatically during the same period, including (and
often especially) in many of these same neighborhoods. It could be,
then, that perceptions of illegitimacy have had little or no effect.2 13
209. Amy Waldman, Diallo Case Tests Bron..'t Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1999, at B1 (explaining that Bronx jurors "do not trust the police" and
consequently convict five to fifteen percent less frequently than jurors in other
parts of the city); Butler, supra note 85, at 678-79, 695 & nn.73-74. See
generally William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795,
1827 & n. 77 (1998) (noting phenomenon of juror holdouts to avoid convicting
Mrican American men, and noting anecdotally that holdouts tend to be African
American women); Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial
Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1260 n.21 (1994) (noting a
juror letter indicating that the jury "didn't want to send anymore Young Black
Men to Jail"); Chris Herring, Bronx Acquittals Set Record, WALL ST. J., May 4,
2010, at A24.
210. Dan Kahan, David Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive flliberalism, 122
HARv. L. REV. 837 (2009) (observing that. perceptions of reasonableness are
culturally constructed); Nancy Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw.
U. L. REV. 877, 900-01 (1999).
211. Cf. Butler, supra note 85, at 719 (encouraging African American jurors
to nullify based on the immorality of both drug laws and drug enforcement).
212. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
213. More generally, public opinion polls consistently have shown little
confidence in the fairness or effectiveness of our criminal justice system. See
Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 123, 123
(2008). Nevertheless, crime rates remain at historic lows, which may indicate
that perceptions of legitimacy have minimal, or at least, secondary normative
effect on levels of deference, and that other factors-for instance, moral
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Or it could be that crime declines would have been substantially
greater had it not been for perceptions of procedural injustice. Or it
could be that, as an initial matter, order-maintenance policing is not
in fact perceived to be illegitimate or that it has had no discernible
effect on the crime decline one way or another. 214 We simply do not
have certain answers to these questions.
Perhaps most importantly, many legitimacy studies fail to get to
the specific question of deference in the first instance. Instead, they
measure only satisfaction with the law or legal authorities and
extrapolate from there.zrs The inductive leap from satisfaction to
deference is strong, but it is still a leap. Perception is one transitive
step removed from compliance with law and cooperation with legal
authorities. Other studies fail to parse out what precisely is meant
by deference. Specifically, perceptions of legitimacy may influence
compliance with substantive law, or they may facilitate cooperation
with enforcement and adjudication procedures, or they may do both,
or they may do neither. And a lack of cooperation itself may be
sliced into weak or strong versions: apathy or outright defiance. The
better studies consider the question of deference directly, but even
some of these studies base their findings solely on self-reports of
how respondents think they would respond to hypothetical unfair
treatment.216
Ultimately, then, for all the research indicating that
procedurally just treatment enhances systemic approval, there is
less to indicate that legitimate procedures do, in fact, influence rates
of compliance with substantive legal rules and cooperation with
legal authorities.217 But we should not be too cynical. Claims of
deference may be nonfalsifiable, but in settings where public-policy
choices must be made, policy makers may be wise to assume that
perceptions of legitimacy do have a sizable effect on rates of
compliance and cooperation (at least in some settings). If nothing
else, Tyler's central premise is appealing and intuitively sound as a
matter of pure analytic reasoning: "If people view compliance with
credibility, incapacitation, conventional deterrence, economic prosperity, or
mere cyclical trends-may play equal or greater roles in predicting compliance
and cooperation.
214. Compare WILLIAM J. BRATTON, TURNAROUND: How M1ERICA'S TOP COP
REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC (1998), with BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 3--5 (2001)
(questioning link between order-maintenance policing and crime decline).
215. Tyler et al., supra note 28, at 54; Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper &
Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of
Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 629, 639
(1989).
216. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1415 (2005)
(finding that people exposed to injustice expressed willingness to commit lowlevel offenses).
217. Cf Reisig et al., supra note 11 (observing that results were unclear
whether legitimacy promoted deference more than distributive fairness).
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the law as appropriate because of their attitudes about how they
should behave, they will voluntarily assume the obligation to follow
legal rules. They will feel personally committed to obeying the law,
irrespective of whether they risk punishment for breaking the
law."218

B.

The Effects of Undermining Moral Credibility
What evidence exists that differences in the criminal law's
moral credibility with the community will track differences in the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system? The most obvious hint
may come from common sense. If citizens see the criminal justice
system as unjust, what motivation would they have to assist itvolunteering as a witness, assisting investigations and
enforcement-or to defer to it-following its rules even when
prosecution is unlikely, following the jury instructions given, joining
in the stigmatization of conduct labeled criminal even when its
condemnab11ity is unclear, or internalizing the societal norms that
criminal law embodies? Common sense tells us that people are more
likely to resist and subvert a criminal justice system that they see as
unjust than they are to assist and defer to it. 219
218. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 3; see also Nadler, supra note 210, at
1405 ("When a particular criminal rule conflicts with the moral intuitions of the
governed community, the power of the criminal law as a whole to induce
compliance is in jeopardy because it is no longer viewed as a trustworthy source
of information regarding which actions are moral and which are not.").
Countless anecdotal examples underscore the insight. For example, one of us
recently interviewed a man named Greg Fairchild, a young Mrican American
professor at the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business. Several
years ago, Fairchild was followed home by a police officer. Shaken by the
possibility that he had been profiled, Fairchild contacted the department, and a
meeting was soon arranged between Fairchild and the Chief of Police. Fairchild
was cynical about the prospects for a productive dialogue. However, the Police
Chief did not stonewall; instead, he expressed empathy and frankly admitted
that the officer may have acted in a normatively problematic manner. The
Chief identified the officer who had tailed Fairchild, and he relayed the officer's
stated reason for doing so. Fairchild was not entirely satisfied with the reason,
buL his anger had abated. Ultimately, Fairchild would come to assist the
department by joining its foundation's board. Remarkably, local lawyers had
previously approached Fairchild about sitting on the very same board, but, at
that time, Fairchild had declined. Fairchild reported: "The only reason I
reconsidered joining the board is because of the way the Chief handled the
circumstances. It absolutely did influence my comfort level." Thus, by
accommodating Fairchild, the Chief had succeeded not only in defusing a
contentious situation, but also in making an ally of an influential community
member. Of course, the Chief might never have met with Fairchild were it not
for the professor's standing in the community. But, by doing so, the Chief had
reshaped Fairchild's perceptions of legitimacy and had facilitated future
cooperation and collaboration. Interview with Greg Fairchild, Professor, Univ.
ofVa. Darden Sch. of Bus., in Charlottesville, Va. (July 10, 2010).
219. The insight is not a new one. As Holmes observed: "(A] law which
punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average member of
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Anecdotal evidence supports this commonsense view. The
notoriously unjust Soviet criminal justice system, ruled by coercion
and threat and tainted by politics and ideology, earned little moral
credibility (or legitimacy) with the public.22o As Peter Solomon
concludes, "Soviet experience demonstrates that indiscriminate and
coercive use of the criminal law approaching naked repression
discredits both the law and the regime that sponsors it." 22 1 Russian
crime rates increased under Soviet rule.222
Further, when
overwhelming state control was lost with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, crime spiked. 22 3 Having destroyed its moral credibility with
the community, the system had little ability to control conduct
through the forces of social or normative influencc.224
the community would be too severe for that community to bear."

HOLMES,

supra note 111, at 50; see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 231 (1957)
(quoting Holmes).
220. See, e.g., Robert A. Kushen, The Death Penalty and the Crisis of
Criminal Justice in Russia, 19 BROOK. J. lNT'L L. 523 (1993); PETER H.
SOLOMON, SOVIET CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STALIN (1996).
221. SoLOMON, supra note 214, at 463. Solomon continues:
During the collectivization campaign Soviet legal officials reduced the
use of legal procedures to the point where their actions resembled
those of other agents of police and local power. As a result the
authority and status of law was called into question, and much effort
expended later on to restore the law to its normal footing. Less
obviously, this account of the history of criminal justice under Stalin
reveals that in an authoritarian regime the criminal sanction was also
limited by capacity for enforcement. When Stalin tried to use the
criminal law for purposes and in ways not accepted by its enforcers
(legal officials, police, and others) or call for penalties that struck
them as too severe, the result was evasion, resistance, and
inconsistent enforcement.
These consequences followed Stalin's
extensions of the criminal law (e.g., to the policing of defective goods
production and the regulation of the labor force); his recriminalization
of old offenses (abortion and juvenile delinquency); and his mandating
of the sharp increases in punishment for theft (in 1932 and in 1947).
The point is that even a dictator whose authority is not limited by
institutional checks faces limitations on his power stemming from the
capacity of his government to enforce his decisions.

ld.
222. See, e.g., Andrew Stickley & Ilkka Henrik Makinen, Homicide in the
Russian Empire and Soviet Union: Continuity or Change?, 45 BRIT. J.

CRIMINOLOGY 647, 658 (2005).
223. See, e.g., JONATHA.Jo.,j WEILER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA: A DARKER SIDE
OF REFORM 2 (2004); Christopher T. Ruder, Individual Rights Under the New

Russian Constitution: A Practical Framework for Competitive Capitalism or
Mere Theoretical Exercise?, 39 ST. Lours U. L.J. 1429, 1156 n.156 (1995)
(discussing sharp increase in crime); Jane Weaver, Are Institutions Doing Their
Job? Kleptocracy and Democracy, 90 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 83 (1996)
(discussing rampant crime in Russia).
224. One might point to American Prohibition as a related example. Once
the criminal justice system lost its moral credibility with a public that routinely
drank alcohol, it lost it normative force with them in areas other than alcohol
consumption. Crime rates rose generally. See CHARLES HANSON TOWNE, THF.
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What recent research has shown is that this effect is not limited
to instances of dramatically bad reputations, as in the Soviet Union.
Even minor changes in moral credibility incrementally affect
people's willingness to acquiesce, assist, and defer to the criminal
law. One technique used in social science research on such issues is
an experiment in which subjects are told of injustices in the current
criminal justice system that they did not previously know about, and
are then tested to see whether the new information changes their
view of the system and their willingness to assist and defer to it.
Obviously the subjects came to the experiment with decades of prior
information about the system-its operation is a common feature of
news reports-and they no doubt had a pre-existing view as to the
system's moral credibility. Within this context, there is a limit to
how much an experimenter can change a subject's view in the brief
period of the experiment.
Yet, the studies show that even
incremental changes in perceptions of justness can and do
incrementally change people's willingness to assist and to defer.
In the most recent and direct study,225 researchers exposed
adult subjects to a range of real-world cases relying upon modern
crime-control doctrines that produced results inconsistent with the
subjects' notions of justice. Subjects' willingness to assist and to
defer when faced with a number of specific kinds of situations was
tested before and after this exposure.226 Subjects were asked, for
example, whether they would report various offenses by other
persons; turn in evidence to the police; report their own accidental
violation; conclude that the prohibition of certain conduct by the law
meant that the conduct was in fact morally condemnable; or
conclude that the law's imposition of a serious penalty meant that
the conduct at issue was in fact morally condemnable.227 In a
separate study, the same researchers tested the same willingness of
subjects to assist and to defer by using two random groups: one that
had been exposed to the unjust cases and one that had not.zzs Both
studies showed similar results: subjects exposed to the unjust cases
were less willing to assist and to defer to the criminallaw.229
RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION: THE Hm,1AN SIDE OF WHAT THE EIGHTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE VOLSTEAD ACT HAVE DONE TO THE UNITED STATES 161,

156-62 (1923) (reciting the statistics on significant crime rate increases for
homicide, burglary, and public disorderly and drunkenness offenses); Mark
Thornton, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS No. 157, ALCOHOL PROHIBITION WAS A
FAILURE 1, 5-8 (July 17, 1991) (reciting crime rate increase statistics, noting
that "crime increased and became 'organized'; the court and prison systems
were stretched to the breaking point; and corruption of public officials was
rampant").
225. Robinson et al., supra note 3.
226. See id. (exploring individuals' attitudes surrounding the criminal
justice system and their willingness to comply with rules of criminal law).
227. Id. at 1999.
228. Id. at 2004.
229. ld. at 1995-2015.

2012]

PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE

259

Another study tested for the same effects using pre-existing
data from large population surveys collected by others. Existing
national databases were examined to see what, if any, relation the
system's moral credibility had on the effective operation of the
criminal justice system. 2 3° One large national survey database
involved telephone interviews with Americans who recently
participated in criminal court proceedings. 2 31
Bivariate and
multivariate statistical techniques were used to determine whether
their responses to the survey questions were consistent with a view
that the system's moral credibility increased their willingness to
defer to the courts to resolve a similar case in the future.232 The
findings support the study conclusions reported above, which is
significant because it involves people who have actual experience
with the criminal courts.
Respondents with criminal court
experience who viewed their community courts as morally credible
in dealing with criminal cases (specifically those involving violence,
drugs or alcohol, and delinquency) expressed a greater willingness
to defer to the criminal justice system in the future.2 33 Subjects who
perceived failures in the criminal justice system were significantly
less likely to say they would defer to the system in the future. 234
A number of previous studies, described below, confirm related
points. Some show the existence of a relationship between an
individual's disbelief in the morality of a particular law and his or
her willingness to obey that law. Other studies show that the
degree to which people report that they have obeyed a law in the
past and plan to obey it in the future correlates with the degree to
which they judge that law to be morally valid. Still other studies go
further to show how perceptions of injustice might lead to more
generalized flouting of the law.
A number of studies have focused on how beliefs about the
morality of a particular law can affect compliance with it. In one
such study, Herbert Jacob showed a greater relation between
compliance and a law's perceived moral correctness than between
compliance and perceived likelihood of punishment for violating
it.235 He concluded that "[t]he relationship between compliance and
230. ld. at 2016-25.
231. Id. at 2017-18.
232. Id. at 2017.
233. Id. at 2023.
234. ld.
235. See Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects of Formal and Informal Sanctions,
2 LAw & PoL'Y Q. 61, 67 (1980). Jacob randomly interviewed 176 people over
the age of eighteen from Evanston, Illinois by allowing a computer to pick
random phone numbers. Id. at 64.
The respondents were interviewed
regarding whether they sped on highways, had smoked marijuana, and whether
they would shoplift a fifty dollar item if no one was looking. Id. at 65.
Marijuana smokers were the most numerous, followed by speeders, followed by
potential shoplifters. Id. at 65-66. Two-thirds of respondents thought the fiftyfive mile-an-hour speed limit was right, three-quarters agreed that the laws
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legitimacy [perceived moral correctness] appears to be considerably
stronger than the one between compliance and perceptions of
severity or certainty of sanctions."23 6 In another study, Grasmick
and Green found similarly that "three independent variables-moral
commitment, perceived threat of legal punishment and threat of
social disapproval-appear to constitute a concise and probably
exhaustive set of factors which inhibit illegal behavior."237 Likewise,
Silberman's study of 14 7 undergraduates at a small private
university, suggested that "[w]hen public sentiment in general
disapproves [of a] given offense, it is relatively unlikely to occur.
Similarly, serious criminal activity is less likely to occur among
those who show a high degree of moral commitment, even though
these individuals might commit less serious offenses."23S
These studies demonstrate that perceptions of the moral
correctness of particular laws can affect compliance with them.
Other studies have gone further to show how perceptions of the
immorality of a particular law or of some act of the criminal justice
system can lead to more generalized effects on compliance. One, in
against shoplifting were conect, but only one-quarter thought the law against
marijuana was correct. Id. at 70. The results showed that for those who think
the speeding laws are right, 62.3% comply, while only 9.8% who think it is
wrong comply. Id. Of those who think the marijuana law is just, 85% do not
smoke marijuana. Id. Contrastingly, only 36% of those respondents who think
that the law is wrong complied with its ban on smoking. Id. There was no
statistical difference in shoplifting, which is evidence of high agreement the
shoplifting is wrong. Id.
236. Id. at 70; see also Robert F. Meier & Weldon T. Johnson, Deterrence as
Social Control: The Legal and Extralegal Production of Conformity, 42 AM. Soc.
REV. 292, 301 (1977) ("The belief that marijuana use is immoral ... functions to
inhibit marijuana use," while "legal threat ... shows a measurable, but
essentially trivial influence on marijuana use/nonuse.").
237. Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social
Disapproval, and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CR1M. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980). A random sample of L100 adults was selected
from the Polk City Directory and subsequently interviewed. Id. at 329.
Information was gathered about the subjects' involvement in eight illegal
activities-theft of property worth less than twenty dollars, theft of property
worth more than twenty dollars, gambling illegally, cheating on tax returns,
intentionally inflicting personal injury, littering, illegal use of fireworks, and
driving under the influence. Id. at 330. The respondents were then asked to
estimate the perceived certainty of arrest, the perceived severity of punishment,
and their moral commitment to adhering to the given legal rule. Id.
238. Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Deterrence, 41 AM. Soc. REV.
442, 457 (1976). 'l'he students responded to whether they had ever committed
certain moral or legal violations, such as assault, use of hard drugs, petty theft,
vandalism, shoplifting, drunk and disorderly conduct, premarital sex,
marijuana use, and drinking under age. Id. at 446. The students then
responded to questions regarding the morality of the act, the certainty of
punishment, the severity of punishment, and peer involvement. Id. One
proposed hypothesis that was being tested was that "[t]he higher the degree of
moral support for the legal regulation of an offense or offenses, the lower the
probability that the offense or offenses will be committed." Id. at 457.
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particular, is a recent investigation by Janice Nadler that looked at
how knowledge of injustices by the criminal justice system can affect
intentions to comply with the law.2:19 Nadler found that subjects
exposed to cases that they viewed as unjust were more likely in a
subsequent mock trial to engage in juror nullification.240
A similar study by Greene presented unjust cases and also
examined their effect on subjects' attitudes.24 1 Greene reached
conclusions similar to Nadler's. Subjects who had read cases in
which the legal system behaved in ways counter to their moral
intuitions rated themselves "more likely to take steps aimed at
changing the law, less likely to cooperate with police, more likely to
join a vigilante or watch group, and less likely to use the law to
guide behavior."242 He further concluded that "overall, subjects
appeared less likely to give the law the benefit of any doubt after
reading cases where the law was at odds with their intuitions."243
A more recent study by Mullen and Nadler showed how the
perception of moral injustice in the legal system can increase rates
of deviant behavior.244 The researchers found that exposure to
239. See Nadler, supra note 210. In one of her experiments, subjects read
mock newspaper stories describing legislation that was perceived as either
highly just, or highly unjust. !d. at 1411. Subjects in the unjust condition later
reported greater intentions to engage in minor acts of law-breaking which were
unrelated to the content of the unjust legislation, such as parking illegally, or
making illegal copies of software. Id. at 1414-15. In a second study, conducted
over the Internet, subjects acted as mock jurors, and had to render a verdict in
a fictional case in which the evidence pointed to a guilty verdict. !d. at 1418,
1423. Prior to this, they were exposed to a mock news story of a (real) crime in
which the protagonist watched his friend abduct and rape a seven-year old girl
in a casino. Id. at 1417, 1424. The story had two versions-one in which the
protagonist was described as being appropriately punished (just version), and
another in which he was not punished at all (unjust version). ld. at 1424. In
the ensuing mock trial scenario, with unrelated content, subjects who had seen
the unjust news story were more likely to engage m juror nullification by
rendering a not guilty decision. Id.
240. See id. at 1424-25.
241. Erich J. Greene, Effects of Disagreements Between Legal Codes and
Lay Intuitions on Respect for the Law (June 2003) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton
University).
242. Id. at iv.
243. Id. at v.
244. See Mullen & Nadler, supra note 174. During the experimental session,
137 undergraduates read a newspaper article that summarized the legal trial of
a doctor who allegedly provided an unlawful late-term abortion. Id. at 1240.
Subjects were randomly assigned to read that the defendant was found guilty or
not guilty. Id. at 1241. One week prior to this session, subjects had completed
a questionnaire that assessed their attitudes about abortion, and these
attitudes were used to predict the critical dependent variable, which was
whether subjects failed to return (i.e., stole) the pen that was provided to fill out
their questionnaire. Id. at 1241-42. Mter subjects completed all the studies,
they were instructed to return their pen and an envelope containing their
materials to designated boxes. Id. at 1241. The researchers numbered the
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outcomes that are inconsistent with a person's strongly held moral
beliefs increases the likelihood of him or her engaging in deviant
behavior.245
Finally, people's common compliance with tax laws raises
interesting issues related to these points.
Large numbers of
American citizens pay their taxes even though the penalty for tax
evasion is not great and the probability of detection is trivial, thus,
the expected cost of such a crime is quite small.246 For these
reasons, many legal scholars believe that the threat of official
sanction does not explain why such large numbers of citizens pay
taxes.2<~7
A survey by Karyl Kinsey sheds some light on the
underlying forces. 248
When people reported that a friend or
coworker, after contact with the IRS, had been made to pay more
taxes than they properly owed, the people thought the tax laws
generally were less fair and were more likely to intend to cheat on
their taxes in the future.
Nadler, in reviewing the study,
commented that "[t]he results of the tax study suggest that exposure
to reports of an unjust legal outcome in a particular situation might
lead to lower perceived fairness of the law more generally, which in
turn can lead to noncompliance with the law in the future."249
Taken together, these studies suggest that knowledge of
systematic injustice produced by the criminal justice system,
particularly when it is intentional, can have a range of deleterious
effects on people's attitudes and on their behavior. People are less
likely to comply with laws they perceive to be unjust. They may also
be less likely to comply with the law generally when they perceive
the criminal justice system as tolerating such injustice. The studies
also show that these effects are not limited to noncompliance, but
apply generally to undermine cooperation and assistance with the
legal system. Further, perceptions of injustice undermining the
system's moral credibility can also affect its ability to harness the
normative forces of social influence and the internalization of norms.
identical pens with ink that was only visible under ultraviolet light. Id.
Therefore, subjects did not know that their pen was numbered but the
experimenter was able to identify the pens that were not returned at the end of
each experimental session. Id. The percentage of subjects who did not return
the pen was substantially higher for those subjects who had strong pro-choice
attitudes, and who were exposed to the guilty verdict-that is, those for whom
the outcome clashed with their moral principles. Id. at 1242.
245. Id. at 1244.
246. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86
VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000).
247. Id.
248. See Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS
Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX
COMPLIA.J.'ICE AND ENFORCEMENT 259 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (exploring the
various reasons behind individuals' compliance and noncompliance with tax
laws).
249. Nadler, supra note 210, at 1409-10.
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The flip side, of course, is that if the criminal justice system reflects
ordinary perceptions of justice, it can take advantage of a range of
psychological mechanisms that serve to increase assistance,
cooperation, compliance, and deference.

IV. COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS: THE ATTRACTION OF
UNFAIRNESS AND INJUSTICE

Given the practical benefits that flow from building a reputation
for fairness and justice, why has the current criminal justice system
adopted practices, procedures, and rules that conflict with these
values? Sometimes the reason is simply a failure to appreciate the
detrimental effects, such as those examined in the preceding Part.
Alternatively, those who shape the rules and practices simply may
not realize just how unfair or unjust they are perceived to be. After
all, there may be a disconnect between lay and professional
perspectives, because the viewpoints of police, prosecutors, and
judges are shaded and shaped by their professional training and
experience. 250 Put differently, what technocrats perceive to be fair
and just is not necessarily what laypersons perceive to be fair and
just.
Criminal-justice functionaries may simply be too
institutionalized to tap and assess their own intuitions as means to
effectively decipher prevailing lay beliefs.2s1
But in circumstances where experts do accurately decipher lay
perceptions, there may be countervailing instrumental advantages
that weigh in favor of maintaining even those procedures and rules
that the public perceives to be unfair or unjust. In other words,
there may be independent reasons-good-faith justifications-for
the criminal justice system to adopt and implement procedures and
rules that undermine lay perceptions of fairness and justice.
Tensions are endemic to a criminal justice system that responds
to discrete (and sometimes competing) justifications for punishment.
For instance, incapacitation may demand longer sentences for less
volitional actors who are more likely to recidivate. By contrast,
desert may call for less punishment for these same people because
250. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); see HEUMANN, supra
note 116, at 1-4.
251. See People v. Warren, 81 N.W. 360, 362 (1899); State v. Williams, 47
N.C. 257, 269 (1855) (contrasting "the good sense of a jury" with the legal
professional who "generalises, and reduces every thing to an artificial system,
formed by study"); Bibas, supra note 119, at 931 (observing that professional
"insiders may take too narrow a view when evaluating what factors matter to
[lay] outsiders"); Hadar Aviram, Trapped in the Law: Legal Actors' Attitudes
Toward Legal Practice as a Solution for Social Problems (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, UC-Berkeley) (explaining that "formal law and legal
indoctrination" inhibit lawyers from considering "external perceptions" that fall
outside "the legal framework within which they operate"), available at
http://works.bepress.com/hadar_aviram/1/.
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they lack the capacity to control their conduct. But such gulfs are
not always unbridgeable.
That is why legitimacy and moral
credibility are such promising enterprises.
Specifically, an
expressive justice system exploits seemingly elusive common ground
between instrumental and deontic impulses.252 By reflecting lay
perceptions of fairness and justice, such a system does better to
optimize crime control than a system that relies exclusively on
conventional instrumental deterrence as a distributive principle,
and it does better to approximate deontological desert (to the extent
there is any such absolute) than a system that structures its rules
and procedures around the intuitions and preferences of moral
philosophers.253 But the common ground is, of course, not limitless,
and hard decisions may follow.

A.

Enforcement Practices
Consider the tradeoffs at work in setting enforcement practices.
Keeping with the earlier example of order-maintenance policing, the
practice carries with it a number of institutional advantages that
stand apart from normative crime control. Specifically, ordermaintenance policing may improve the quality of life in high-crime
areas not only by responding to the immediate disorder but also by
facilitating a high volume of searches and arrests that help police
discover evidence of more serious past or present crimes and compile
a database that police may use to investigate future crimes. 254 One
of us has criticized aggressive use of order-maintenance policing as a
low-cost, high-volume (and therefore easily over-used) mechanism to
stop, search, and arrest.255 As indicated, it is unclear whether the
public agrees with the criticism-that is, whether it perceives
aggressive order-maintenance policing to be unfair and, if so, under
what circumstances. But, significantly, even if the public agrees, its
misapprehensions would and should not end the analysis. A final
determination of whether and how often the approach ought to be
252. See Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 3, at 477 (arguing
that a justice system cannot be effective in its goal unless it shares the public's
"overriding concern" for "doing justice").
253. Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra note 3, at 42-43.
254. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION § 1.01, at 1-2 (5th ed. 2010) (describing "spillover"
phenomenon whereby police enforce minor crimes as a mechanism "to expand
police authority to investigate more serious crimes"); Bowers, supra note 244, at
1693-99; Bowers, supra note 76, at 95-96; Rosen, supra note 75, at 26 ("Instead
of prosecuting lower-level offenses to encourage an atmosphere of social order
that would prevent more serious crime, [authorities] began prosecuting lowerlevel offenses in order to catch more serious criminals." (emphasis added)); see,
e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 208, at 44 (quoting NYPD Commissioner, William
Bratton: "Every arrest was like opening a box of Cracker Jack. What kind of toy
am I going to get? Got a gun? Got a knife? Got a warrant? ... It was
exhilarating for the cops.").
255. Bowers, supra note 244, at 1698--99; Bowers, supra note 76, at 120.
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used must take into account the independent institutional police
advantages. Ultimately, the institutional advantages of ordermaintenance policing may trump even the costs that flow from
genuine perceptions of unfairness.256
Moreover, a system must measure a normatively problematic
practice against the available alternatives. For example, one of us
has made the argument that aggressive use of order-maintenance
policing is a less intrusive enforcement strategy than historical
exercises of rough justice. 25 7 Specifically, police are no longer
permitted to crack skulls or to exploit formless loitering statutes,
but they can lawfully stop and frisk.2 58 Indeed, a prominent legal
historian has argued that the Supreme Court was aware of this
tradeoff, holding vagrancy statutes unconstitutional only after
formulating Terry as a viable substitute.25 9 On this reading, Terry
may be an equally effective but less invasive (and therefore more
defensible) enforcement strategy, even if the public fails to perceive
it as such, which, as indicated, is an open question.26o
With respect to any police practice, the core question ought to be
whether a court appropriately balances individual liberties and
effective law enforcement. If a court does so, then its decision is
proper, even if the public fails to perceive that the balance is
adequately struck. But, as discussed, effective law enforcement is
probably undermined (at least to a degree) when the public believes
authorities are behaving unfairly.261 Thus, perceptions are critical

256. Certainly, policy makers believe the advantages outweigh any
normative legitimacy costs.
HARCOURT, supra note 208, at 3-5 (citing
department heads who believe that order-maintenance policing works); Long,
supra note 208 (quoting NYPD Commissioner, Ray Kelly: "This is a proven law
enforcement tactic to fight and deter crime, one that is authorized by criminal
procedure law."); Rivera et al., supra note 77 (quoting department head that
concentrated and significant use of stop-and-frisk "had a significant impact" on
crime reduction).
257. Bowers, supra note 244, at 1695-97 (discussing unavailability of rough
justice as mode of social control); Josh Bowers, The Limits of Legal Limits
(forthcoming).
258. Compare Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), and
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
259. RISA GOLUBOFF, PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE: 'fHE SIXTIES, THE SUI'REME
COURT AND VAGRANCY LAW (forthcoming).
260. One study found that individuals perceive formal arrests to be more
legitimate than brief stops. Engel, supra note 44, at 469 (observing that
citizens were more likely to perceive procedural injustice in traffic stops that
resulted in citations than traffic stops that resulted in arrest); Bowers, supra
note 244, at 1696 (noting public anxiety over stops and frisks that do not result
in arrests). Somewhat counter-intuitively, then, individuals may favor a
vagrancy of arrests (and consequent criminal charges) to less intrusive and
more cursory Terry stops.
261. See Nick Pearce, Rethinking Fairness, 14 PUB. PoL'Y REs. 11, 15 (2007)
(detailing research which "found that a crucial factor in people's willingness to
cooperate with law enforcement activities was the legitimacy in which the police
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to the balance, but not necessarily determinative. For example, the
public may disagree with the Court's ruling that police are
authorized to arrest individuals for even nonjailable offenses. But,
as Richard Frase has argued, officers could not so readily engage in
order-maintenance policing without the power. 26 2
Thus,
independent institutional advantages may trump lay perceptions of
unfairness. Likewise, the public may feel that the Court has been
too deferential in delineating the permissible scope and bases for
Terry stops and frisks. But such deference may be necessary to
optimize crime control and, again, to effectuate order-maintenance
policing. As stated before, the Court's constitutional focus is on the
balance between liberty and order, 21:i3 and we think that to be the
right focus. Our bottom line is simply that lay perceptions ought to
matter to this balance. Thus, the Court ought to consider as a factor
what, for example, the public thinks of pretextual stops, 264 exigency
and consent searches,265 plain-view seizures,266 and the use of
evidence of flight and presence in high-crime neighborhoods as
relevant to determinations of the existence of reasonable suspicion
and probable cause.267 And, if the public disapproves of any of these
practices, standards, and rules, then the Court probably ought to
defer to public preferences for equally effective alternatives,
provided such alternatives exjst. But, at the same time, the Court
ought to endorse unpopular practices, standards, and rules where
there are sufficient good-faith reasons to continue them. For
instance, the Court ought not disturb lightly those practices critical
to the nation's war on terrorism-whatever the public may think of
the practices in question. In this way, perceptions may do their best
work as a kind of tiebreaker.

B.

Adjudication Procedures
Just as a system may have plausible reasons to adopt police
practices that contravene popular perceptions of fairness, so too may
may implement adjudicatory practices that advance some overriding
justifiable alternative purpose that cannot effectively be served by
were held, which in turn derived from the perception of the justice of the force's
procedures and whether or not it treated individuals fairly'').
262. Richard Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FoRDHAM L. REV. 329,
350 n.97 (2002) ("[A] strategy of 'zero tolerance policing' requires and justifies
arrests for minor crimes.").
263. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 32; United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273-78 (2002); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1989); United States
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983);
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
264. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
265. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
266. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
267. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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procedures that accord narrowly with lay preferences. Concretely,
adjudicatory ends that are "legitimate" in the colloquial sense (that
is, defensible) may counterintuitively run up against the public's
conceptions of legitimate (that is, procedurally fair) adjudicatory
practices.
To understand the conflicting values potentially at play,
consider the exclusionary rule and other rules and standards
intended to deter official misconduct. A system may justifiably
settle on an exclusionary rule that deters police misconduct, even if
people perceive the rule to provide guilty defendants with unfair
windfalls that promote unequal treatment and underenforcement.26S
Conversely, a system may justifiably limit the reach of an
exclusionary rule that provides no added deterrent, even if people
desire a more robust rule.269 Likewise, a system may justifiably
adopt a double jeopardy rule that deters prosecutorial harassment
or a speedy trial rule that deters prosecutorial foot-dragging, even if
the public feels such rules are, alternatively, insufficiently or overly
protective. The takeaway is not that perceptions of legitimacy ought
to trump other considerations or that other considerations ought to
trump legitimacy-only that there ought to be a balance of the
competing objectives and values at play. And there are empirical
questions not just about public perceptions but also about whether
alternative instrumental ends are well served by deviating from
public perceptions. Ultimately, then, perceptions matter, but they
are not all that matters. The problem, at present, is that it is not
clear whether the exclusionary rule is even perceived to be unfair
(and, if so, in what circumstances), much less whether any
perceptions of unfairness are outweighed by good-faith justifications
for keeping or, alternatively, limiting or scrapping the rule.
An apt analogy may be to the frequently drawn distinction
between conduct and decision rules.
Categorical substantive
conduct rules are intended to shape lay behavior and reflect moral
intuitions, while procedurally oriented decision rules are intended to
optimally constrain state power and/or soften rigid application of
conduct rules. 270 Concretely, conduct and decision rules serve

268. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
269. See Bilz, supra note 104; see, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 141 (2009) (refusing to apply exclusionary rule in circumstances in which
its use does not result in "appreciable deterrence").
270. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAw CONVERSATIONS, supra note 3, at
3, 7 ("By framing its imperatives in familiar language, the law echoes and
reinforces the layperson's ordinary moral beliefs, whereas the technical legal
definitions can effectively guide professional decision-makers.") [hereinafter
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules 1.1]; see also Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984) [hereinafter Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and
Conduct Rules 1].
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separate values. But, critically, they must coexist in a justice
system. Thus, the system may justifiably endorse and adopt, say,
an exclusionary rule even if the public sharply disfavors the
consequent Type II errors (that is, wrongful dismissals and
acquittals).
In such circumstances, legitimacy costs are the
necessary and inevitable byproduct of "acoustic leakage" between
desirable conduct rules that track lay intuitions and (otherwise)
desirable decision rules that effectively cabin authority and
facilitate individualized adjudication.zn
The exclusionary rule is but one example of an adjudicatory
procedure that may be justifiably kept or discarded for reasons
independent of lay perceptions of fairness. The following is a roughand-ready (and far from exhaustive) list of additional examples of
potentially defensible adjudicatory rules, standards, and practices
that, nevertheless, may deviate from public perceptions of fairness.
First, a well-functioning justice system almost certainly must abide
some amount of Type I error (that is, wrongful conviction), even if
people find fair only an evidentiary standard of proof beyond all
doubt.272
Second, a system may justifiably consider the
psychological harm to a child victim of sex abuse, even if people
perceive it to be unfair to restrict the ability of a defendant to
confront his accuser face-to-face.273 Third, a system may permit
271. Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules I, supra note 264, at
652; see also Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules II, supra note 264,
at 3-11 (describing the "gap" created "between legal and moral obligation" as
"the inevitable price" to be paid by a system that wishes to maximize crime
control but minimize the reach of state power). Such legitimacy costs can,
however, be minimized. The system ought to avoid adopting or implementing
standards that disingenuously purport to express public perceptions when in
fact they serve alternative ends. A case in point is the Court's strained
application of the ostensible reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Florida
v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (permitting helicopter surveillance); United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (permitting remote tracking of vehicles); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (permitting dog sniffs); see also William J_
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 444
(1995) (describing the Court's application of the reasonable expectation of
privacy as "implausibl[e)," "ridiculous," and "irrational"). If the system is to
contravene lay intuitions (as it sometimes must), then it ought to do so
honestly.
272. See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust
Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 92 (1999) (discussing the evidence
that wrongful convidion is an "unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the
routine operation of the criminal justice system" and proposing various
remedies for those proven wrongfully convicted).
273. By way of further example, studies have shown that restorative justice
practices-like circle sentencing-promote perceptions of systemic legitimacy
and provide stakeholders a measure of "process control." Nevertheless, a court
may reject the practices as inefficient and as insufficiently attentive to core
questions of guilt and innocence. Erik Luna, CRIMINAL LAw CONVERSATIONS,
supra note 3, at 594 (conceding that restorative justice cannot address
"whodunit" questions).
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lawyers to make unfettered nondiscriminatory peremptory
challenges to help ensure that impartial juries are empaneled.2 74
Fourth, a system may procedurally bar defendants and convicts
from pursuing many types of innocence claims to promote finality,
certainty, efficiency, and rule utility.275 Fifth, a system may prohibit
trial jurors from learning sentencing consequences pre-verdict to
advance rule-of-law considerations and to minimize nullification
concerns.276
Sixth, a system may exclude victims from the
adjudicatory process to promote efficiency, professionalism, and
uniform decision-making. 277
Finally, no analysis of procedural rules and standards would be
complete without considering plea bargaining-the most prevalent
adjudicatory practice in American criminal justice. Plea bargaining
promotes certainty, autonomy, and, even perhaps, proportionality in
an age in which determinate sentencing laws are insufficiently
tailored to desert.278 More than anything else, plea bargaining
facilitates the efficient resolution of criminal cases-a benefit that is
not just desirable but perceived to be necessary in a criminal justice
system that features high caseloads, costly rules of procedure, and
inadequate resources to provide trials to even a sizable fraction of
defendants.279 Indeed, the instrumental arguments in favor of plea
bargaining are so powerful that many critics have abandoned efforts
to abolish the institution.2 80 As such, the legitimacy project's better
focus may be targeted reforms of discrete plea-bargain practices that
the public may find to be particularly unfair. For example, the
public may perceive Alford pleas to be more illegitimate than
conventional pleas, and, significantly, the instrumental benefits of
the pleas are comparatively less clear-cut. Specifically, Alford pleas
are said to contribute to expeditious case processing and to provide a
mechanism for innocent defendants to avail themselves rationally of
the advantages of bargaining, but the pleas may concurrently
274. Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 237-38 (2005); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
275. c:'[. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2009) (Scalia, J ., dissenting).
276. Cf. United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1966); Pope v.
United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1961).
277. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
278. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970); FEF.LEY, supra note 116, at 27-28 (discussing
plea bargaining as a means to achieve substantively just results); HEUMANN,
supra note 116; Frank E. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101
YALE. L.J. 1969, 1976 ("Why is liberty too important to be left to the defendant
whose life is at stake? Should we not say instead that liberty is too important
to deny effect to the defendant's choice?").
279. See, e.g., Davidson, 367 F.2d 60; Pope, 298 F.2d 507; George Fisher,
Plea-Bargaining's Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 864-68 (2000) (tracing history of
plea bargaining as a response to docket pressure).
280. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 122, at 1369-70; O'Hear, supra note 114, at
409.
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facilitate wrongful convictions and thereby undermine the systemic
search for truth.281 Another potential area for reform involves
cooperation agreements, which are intended to serve crime-control
objectives by permitting law enforcement to penetrate the upper
echelons of criminal syndicates, but which may lead not to the
capture of big fish but only to the capture of bigger schools of small
fish.282 Finally, many jurisdictions prohibit judicial involvement
with plea bargaining,zss notwithstanding findings showing that
people perceive plea bargaining to be more legitimate the more it
comes to resemble mediation.284 On the one hand, such bars to
judicial participation may promote neutrality in the supervision of
guilty pleas (or trials in the unlikely event the parties fail to
consummate pleas).2Rfi On the other hand, judicial participation
may check prosecutors who may use superior bargaining power to
leverage inequitable pleas. In short, plea bargaining is no onedimensional practice, and, accordingly, perceptions of legitimacy
may have a lot to say about discrete aspects, even if the practice isas it were-too big to fail.

Liability and Punishment Rules
Some deviations from community views of justice may reflect
simply a failure to understand those views. Serious empirical
research on the issue is relatively recent.286 However, in many other
instances, an admitted deviation from empirical desert is justified
by some specific interest that it advances. Below we consider two
sorts of justifications: first, rules whose drafters acknowledge the
value of a desert distribution but who argue that, given the
complexities of the real world, that desert goal is sometimes best
achieved by adopting a legal rule that on its face may not seem to
put desert first; second, rules that openly reject desert in favor of
some other interest, including reducing future crime, or promoting
an interest unrelated to criminal justice, such as assisting
international diplomacy possibly by providing immunity to
C.

281. See generally Bibas, supra note 122 (condemning Alford pleas).
282. Safer & Crowl, supra note 125, at 44.
283. I'v1ARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 390 (2d
ed. 2005) (noting that more than half of the states and the federal system
instruct the judge not to "participate" in the plea discussions); see also FED. R.
CRIM. P. ll(c)(l).
284. Sergio Herzog, Plea-Bargaining Practices: Less Covert, More Public
Support?, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 590, 606 (2004).
285. See, e.g., State v. Bouie, 817 So. 2d 48, 55 (La. 2002) (holding that a
judge could warn a defendant about consequences of conviction, but his express
opinion on date of trial that conviction was "all but a foregone conclusion"
constituted sufficient coercion to render the plea involuntary).
286. Note the publication dates on the many studies cited supra Part ILB.
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diplomats.
Consider the deviations from desert reported and
documented by Robinson and CahilJ.287
Some deviations from desert are adopted out of fear that a more
desert-based rule would be subject to easy manipulation and abuse,
and thus would produce less justice, not more.zss Rules of this sort
include the criminal law's near-universal common rejection of a
reasonable mistake of law defense, and the rejection of an insanity
defense by some states and limitations on its availability in other
states.zsg It also is common for states to ignore the individual
characteristics of a defendant in making liability judgments, as in
judging provocation or negligence, including ignoring the person's
incapacities that make it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to
have avoided the violation.290
A deviation rule also may be adopted because a more desertbased rule would encounter evidentiary problems, which would
reduce the reliability of the process. For example, statutes of
limitation were adopted to avoid the dangers of stale evidence.291
Strict liability is imposed in cases where culpability is likely to exist
but may be difficult to prove.292 And coerced confessions and
uncounseled lineups are excluded to avoid false recriminations.
Another reason for a rule that on its face would seem to promote
failures of justice is its tendency to promote justice in many other
cases, often cases seen as more important, where the failure of
justice would be more outrageous. Plea bargains and witness
immunity are examples. They may be granted for quite serious

287. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY
THE LAW DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE chs. 2-8 (2006) [hereinafter
LWJ].
288. For a general discussion, see id. at 22-88.
289. See, e.g., MODEL PF.NAL CODE § 2.04(3) (1985) (disallowing mistake of
law as a defense to prosecution outside of two very narrow exceptions); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004) ("Mental condition shall not be a defense to any
charge of criminal conduct."); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770-71 (2006)
(upholding Arizona's insanity defense statute allowing evidence of mental
illness, which prevents the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's
action, but disallowing evidence that mental illness prevented one from forming
the mens rea required for the crime).
290. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985) (defining negligence as
a "gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor's situation").
291. See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45
AM. CRJM. L. REV. 115, 115-16 (2008) (describing the purposes of statutes of
limitations as "protect[ing] individuals from having to defend themselves
against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage
of time ... encouraging government agents promptly to investigate suspected
criminal activity").
292. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, DEPAUL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (describing one advantage of strict liability as avoiding the
often costly and time-consuming task of proving negligence).
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offenses if the cooperation thereby gained will allow the successful
prosecution of even more serious offenses by others.
These deviation rules do risk undermining the system's moral
credibility, and they ought to be maintained only if there is no other,
nondcviation means of achieving the objective. A careful review of
these rules and their effects may suggest that not all are fully
justified in their present form. Nonetheless, some of these deviation
doctrines will stand up to that scrutiny because they really do
promote justice. 293 Good intentions count a good deal in setting
reputation, so it would be worthwhile for the criminal justice system
to make clear its desert-based rationales in adopting doctrines that
appear to deviate from desert. It can be important to the system's
moral credibility that it is in any case trying to do justice as best it
can in a complex world.
Other doctrines that deviate from desert do openly sacrifice
desert, typically to pursue some other interest thought to be
important. Most obvious are the doctrines distributing criminal
liability and punishment to optimize general deterrence or
incapacitation of the dangerous, which deviate from desert to
advance those traditional coercive crime-control programs.294
General deterrence may present crime-control opportunities
because of its potential to affect an entire population of potential
offenders. The deviation from desert in a single case or a small
group of cases might be enough to send an effective deterrent
message to a very large group of potential offenders. On the other
hand, as one of us has shown elsewhere,2 9 5 it is likely that one or
more of the prerequisites for a deterrent effect will be missing,
thereby subverting the possibility of such striking gains.
A deterrence-based rule can have no effect unless the target
audience knows of the rule, directly or indirectly, yet the studies
show that such knowledge of legal rules is weak, even among those
who have special reasons to learn those rules. Further, even if the
target knows of the rule, a rule can have no effect unless the target
is a rational calculator who can and will choose to act in his rational
self-interests. Yet the majority of the people most likely to need the
coercive deterrent threat are not such rational calculators. Finally,
even if the target knows the rule and is a rational calculator, he will
not be deterred unless his rational calculations lead him to believe
that the risk of committing the offense outweighs its benefits. Yet,
293. For a more detailed account of deviations from empirical desert that
might be tolerated, see ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at ch.
12.
294. For a general discussion, see LWJ, tsupra note 281, at 117-36.
295. See, e.g., ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PK1NCIPLES, supra note 3, at chs. 3-4;
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004); Paul H. Robinson
& ,John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law
Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).
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again, the data suggests that the low conviction rates that exist for
almost all offenses make the risk of punishment in most situations
sufficiently low that most targets will ignore it. Having a criminal
justice system will deter, but manipulating liability and punishment
rules within that system will work only in the atypical cases in
which all three of these prerequisites to effective deterrence will be
satisfied.
Add to this the fact that there is already a deterrent threat
inherent in just punishment; deterrence-based rules can do better
than desert-based rules only in those cases in wh1ch the former
deviate from desert-do injustice or cause a failure of justice-yet it
is in just these deviation cases that the deterrence program is at its
weakest. People assume the law is as they think it should bewhich they think is a desert-based rule-hence they will know of a
different, deterrence-based rule only if the system has undertaken a
special education campaign. And it is in these deviation-from-desert
cases in which people----<:itizens, jurors, witnesses, police,
prosecutors, and judges-are most likely to subvert and resist the
system rather than to help it.
Indeed, it does not follow that a deviation from desert is
justified even in those instances in which the deterrence
prerequisites are satisfied. A deviation is justified only if the
general deterrent effect would be so great as to outweigh even the
long-term detriment to the criminal justice system's moral
credibility from such a deliberate choice to do injustice or to fail to
do justice. Even a single well-publicized case that conflicts with
community intuitions of justice (and recall that well-publicized cases
are often the most useful for general deterrence) can have a serious
detrimental effect on the criminal justice system's reputation
because the deliberateness of the deviation reveals the system's lack
of full commitment to doing justice.
Because incapacitation of the dangerous is so effective at
preventing future crimes by the individual offenders detained, it
may present substantial crime-control opportunities. But it is not
necessarily true that those opportunities will regularly justify
deviation from desert. First, of course, such deviations undermine
the criminal law's moral credibility.
But beyond that, such
preventive detention faces other hurdles. The cost of a deviation
from desert can be justified only if its crime control cannot be
achieved through nondeviation means.
In this instance, the
possibility for civil preventive detention of dangerous persons means
that incapacitation cannot justify undermining the moral credibility
of the criminal justice system. And, as one of us has argued
elsewhere, such an open civil preventive system is likely to be both
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fairer to detainees and more protective and less costly for the
community.296
Beyond these crime-control interests of general deterrence and
incapacitation, other criminal justice related interests are also
offered as justification for deviations. As Parts II.A and III.A make
clear, fairness in reaching a result, not just the justness of the
result, can be important to society. At stake here is not only the
deontological interest in fairness but also the practical interest in
the power of legitimacy discussed previously. As Part V explains,
the demands of fairness may suggest procedures or practices that
tend to frustrate doing justice.297
In preparation for Part V, let us give a few examples to
illustrate the point. The legality principle bars conviction for offense
conduct that was not specifically described in a previously existing
prohibition, even if most people, including the offender, believed
that the conduct was prohibited. The exclusionary rule may bar the
use of clearly reliable evidence in order to discourage police from
engaging in unauthorized searches or seizures, even if such
exclusion lets a clearly guilty offender go free. Speedy trial rules,
designed to discourage prosecutorial delay, can have a similar effect.
The bar against "double jeopardy" operates to limit prosecutorial
abuse through repeated prosecutions, even if it means the clearly
guilty will escape the punishment they deserve. The entrapment
defense, which is designed to discourage overzealous police, can give
a defense even if the offender is a career criminal looking for an
opportunity to commit the offense. Like the exclusionary rule, the
entrapment defense, especially the objective police-misconduct
formulation of it as appears in the Code,298 seeks to control police
overreaching.
Still other deviation rules are justified on grounds unrelated to
the criminal justice system,299 as with diplomatic and official
immunity, which are said to promote international interchange and
governmental independence, respectively. Similarly, non-criminaljustice interests are being advanced when the unique condemnatory
power of criminal conviction is used to boost the prohibition of minor
regulatory violations.
Each of these deviation rules may have some justification, but
there is also reason to believe that each incurs a cost to the criminal
justice system by undermining its moral credibility.
The
detrimental effects of such reduction in moral credibility suggests
that each deviation rule merits reevaluation to determine whether
296. See ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at ch. 6; Paul H.
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal
Justice, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
297. For a general discussion, see LWJ, supra note 281, at 89-116, 137-85.
298. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.13 (1985).
299. For a general discussion, see LWJ, supra note 281, at 186--204.
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its benefits outweigh its costs and whether the same benefits might
be as effectively produced by a nondeviation means.
V. THE OCCASIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND
MORAL CREDIBILITY

The previous discussions have made clear that perceptions of
fairness in enforcement and adjudication are distinct from and
independent of perceptions of justice in the distribution of liability
and punishment. This is not to say that the two dynamicslegitimacy and moral credibility-are unrelated. To the contrary,
they are often 'mutually reinforcing.3oo Significantly, however, they
are not always symbiotic. A procedurally fair system may generate
seriously unjust results, and a procedurally unfair system may
nonetheless produce just results. In short, the police practices,
criminal adjudication procedures, and criminal liability rules within
a jurisdiction may be in very different states. More importantly for
our purposes, not only is it possible for fair practices and procedures
and just punishment to be on different tracks, but sometimes they
are on a collision course. Specifically, practices and procedures that
advance fairness sometimes can undermine justice.
And
enforcement practices and adjudication procedures that would most
effectively advance justice may be seen as unfair.

A.

Points of Tension

Consider, for example, such stalwarts of the American criminal
justice system as the prohibition against allowing prosecutors to rely
on illegally seized evidence, retry acquitted defendants, or delay
trials as best suits effective prosecution. The rights against double
jeopardy and to a speedy trial, as well as the exclusionary rule, all
have been constitutionally enshrined to some extent. Yet it may
well be that the virtues that drive these procedural rules are not
accuracy in truth finding or reliability in doing justice. On the
contrary, each of these rules, and many others, can easily frustrate
justice. 301
The exclusionary rule can exclude reliable evidence that allows
the perpetrator of even a serious offense to go free, a result that
300. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler et al., Armed and Dangerous(?): Motivating Rule
Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 457 (2007)
(observing that the implementation of fair procedures reinforces the perception
that the system shares and honors the public's moral values).
301. See, for example, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976), where the
constitutional rules prohibited the government from using silence as evidence of
guilt. See also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (''The illogic of the [rule] is plain, for it runs exactly counter to
normal evidentiary inferences: If I ask my son whether he saw a movie I had
forbidden him to watch, and he remains silent, the import of his silence is
clear."). See generally LWJ, supra note 281 (cataloguing the variety of
justifications for and the doctrines used in deviating from desert).
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cannot help but draw the criminal justice system into disrepute, at
least with regard to its commitment for doing justice. In the case of
Larry Eyler, for example, police suspected Eyler of a string of
gruesome killings of young gay men. When a state trooper just
happened upon Eyler parked on the side of the highway preparing
for another kill of a young hitchhiker, he became suspicious, called
headquarters and heard of prior suspicions, and took Eyler to the
station, probably saving the hitchhiker's life. A search of Eyler's
vehicle turned up conclusive proof of his previous crimes, but the
court excluded the evidence because the search was unlawfuJ.302
Eyler was released to kill again, and indeed did so before
subsequently being captured and convicted for the later crime. 303
Many may wonder whether this frustration of justice, together with
its high cost in human life, is worth the benefits that the
exclusionary rule offers.
The double jeopardy bar may present a similar situation. In the
case of Melvin Ignatow, for example, Brenda Schaefer was brutally
raped, tortured, and killed by lgnatow and his former girlfriend. At
trial, the girlfriend testified for the prosecution but came off as an
unreliable witness, and Ignatow simply lied his way to reasonable
doubt. He was acquitted. Ten months later, as the new owners of
Ignatow's former house were putting down new carpeting, they
found film taped inside a floor duct. When the film was developed, it
provided a grisly record of Ignatow's horrendous offense, yet
Ignatow could not be retried for the murder. 304 Again, this gross
failure of justice is likely to undermine in many peoples' minds the
system's commitment to doing justice.305
302. John Conroy, The Return of Larry Eyler, CHI. READER (July 30, 1992),
available at http://www .chicagoreader .com/chicago/the-return -of-larry -eyler
/Content?oid=880169.
·
303. LWJ, supra note 281, at 139-49, 157-59.
304. Id. at 159-66.
305. For example, when law students are asked to judge what, if any,
liability and punishment lgnatow deserves, 100% impose liability, with a mean
and a mode of life imprisonment;

Liability and Punishment
No liability
1 day
2 weeks
2 months
6 months
1 year
3 years
7 years
15 years
30years
Life
Death
Liability but no punishment

Student Response

1%
1%
1%
2%
17%
67%
10%
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Or imagine that an Eyler or an Ignatow is released because of a
speedy trial violation, a statute of limitations has run, or the text of
an offense statute was ambiguous (even though the defendant knew
his conduct was wrong).306 The fairness interests may be clearspeedy trial rights, statutes of limitations, and the legality principle
are common and well established-but the justice costs can be
significant.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to insist on adhering to the
conventional standards and rules that are premised on fairness
concerns. First, and obviously, fairness is an important value in
itself. But there are practical crime-control reasons beyond this, as
Parts ILA and III.A have shown. But one can say more. For
example, the system's adherence to these fairness rules, even in
such costly cases, advertises the extent of its commitment to them.
Indeed, it is the costs of undermining justice in discrete cases that
may do the most to advertise just how devoted the system is to these
fairness interests. If the system is willing to follow such rules, even
when they undermine justice in such egregious cases, the message
says, then citizens can have confidence that the rules certainly will
be followed in the more common, less egregious cases. That
demonstration of high commitment enhances the system's
legitimacy, with its consequent benefits of greater deference and
compliance.
However, one can imagine ways in which a society might strike
a different balance between fairness and justice on these, and other,
issues. A system might limit application of the rules, perhaps by
applying them less rigorously in cases of serious offenses, as some
have suggested.307
Or a system might shift to alternative
procedures that could effectively advance fairness interests without
jeopardizing justice-for example, by replacing the exclusionary rule
with a robust civil-compensation or administrative-disciplinary
regime that could punish police for unlawful searches of any
individual (and not just for unlawful searches of accused
offenders).308 Or a system might narrow application of rules and
standards in circumstances where the threat of injustice is high, but
the threat of unfairness is low. For example, the system might bar

PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSTRS, TEACHER'S
MANUAL (2d ed. 2008).
306. See, e.g., Keeler v. Super. Ct. of Amador Cnty., 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970)
(reversing murder conviction where statute did not unambiguously cover killing
of fetus); Billingslea v. State, 780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (reversing
abuse conviction where code did not provide adult :son with duty to care for
elderly disabled mother who was living in his home).
307. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) ("If ... the
exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable deterrence, then, clearly, its use
in the instant situation is unwarranted.").
308. See, e.g., LWJ, supra note 281, at 149-55.
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application of double jeopardy when a defendant's deceptive conduct
helped generate the original acquittal.309

B.

Resolving the Conflict
As the last Subpart demonstrates, although a system should
strive to realize both values, this may not always be possible.
Specifically, in the previous Subpart, we explored tensions between
legitimacy and moral credibility and identified a number of discrete
rules and standards-the exclusionary rule, speedy trial guarantees,
and protections against double jeopardy-that may be defensible on
fairness grounds even where they promote injustice.
More
generally, the question arises: Which objective is superior where a
system might achieve only one? We can look at this question in
either of two ways. We can attempt to resolve the deontological
tensions between fairness and justice generally, which is the larger
debate that takes up a noticeable part of moral philosophy, criminal
procedure, and criminal law theory scholarship. Or we can attempt
to resolve the narrower question of which value ought to be
preferred where the goal is gaining deference to and compliance
with the criminal justice system. For most of this Article, our focus
has been on the narrow question, but, significantly, our answer
would generally be the same under either perspective: although
legitimacy may be the superior value in discrete circumstances (as
discussed above and below), moral credibility is more often to be
preferred in unfortunate circumstances where a system may
optimize only one.
Overall, Tyler seems to concede that moral credibility has a
much greater effect in shaping compliance than does legitimacy,310
but no doubt the answer is more complex than to always prefer
moral credibility. It may depend on the setting. In different
contexts, one or the other justification carries potentially greater
normative force. For instance, in the order-maintenance policing
context, the state cannot rely on moral credibility because many of
the governing laws are borderline regulatory public-order crimes
that lack inherent normative punch.311 Instead, legitimacy is the
sole source of genuine normative power. In fact, legitimacy may be
the sole effective source of any power because traditional carrots and
sticks are particularly insufficient for deterring commonplace
borderline crime. Police must necessarily be selective because
309. See, e.g., id. at 16-68.
310. Tyler reports the relative weight of the factors shaping compliance with
the law as: morality 0.33, legitimacy 0.11, deterrence 0.02. TYLER, WPOL,
supra note 1, at 59.
311. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1894
(2000) ("The more 'crime' includes things only a slight majority of the
population thinks is bad, the harder it is to sell the idea that 'criminal' is a label
that only attaches to very bad people."); Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law
Care?, supra note 3, at 1865 n.84.
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offenses of this kind are typically so prevalent.3 12 This creates a
further complication: selective enforcement may feed perceptions of
bias and illegitimacy, which may generate more disobedience, which
may lead to even more selective enforcement, which may further
feed perceptions of illegitimacy.313 The situation is delicate and
potentially counterproductive. Procedural fairness is left alone to do
the heavy lifting without the backstops of moral credibility and
instrumental deterrence, and the enforcement process, if perceived
to be unfair, may succeed only in making the load heavier.314 If
nothing else, the potential for a negative feedback loop provides yet
another powerful reason to reconsider the degree to which we rely
on the criminal law to achieve regulatory ends.315
Comparatively, when it comes to mala in se crimes, even if the
public were to perceive legal authorities to be somewhat illegitimate,
and even if an instrumental approach were unable to deter the
rational bad actor, ordinary individuals would still tend to comply
for the simple reason that ordinary individuals are not, in the main,
bad actors. They obey murder statutes and cooperate with murder
investigations and prosecutions (discounting, of course, fears of
reprisal) because their moral aversion to homicide is that strong.3 16
With serious mala in se crimes, moral credibility alone may prove
somewhat effective, even with low levels of legitimate (or even much
of any) enforcement.317
In sum, procedural fairness 1s more important to the
enforcement of regulatory crime, while moral credibility is more
important to the enforcement of conventional crime. This may be
reason alone to emphasize moral credibility over legitimacy (in the
event that a criminal justice system were competent to emphasize
only one) because moral credibility operates best within the
traditional criminal law domain of mala in se offenses, while
312. Tyler, supra note 13, at 312 (noting that in circumstances where there
is "insufficient risk to motivate compliance ... the legal system benefits when
people voluntarily defer to regulations ... even when they do not anticipate
being caught").
313. Bowers, supra note 76, at 91 (noting that the law's '"normative punch' is
weakened when communities identify with criminals over the police and view
enforcement as 'oppressive and discriminatory,' rather than 'stigmatizing"').
314. Stuntz, supra note 305, at 1879--80 (focusing on how criminalizing and
criminally enforcing vice crimes may prove counter-productive).
315. LWJ, supra note 281, at 186-95.
316. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care?, supra note 3, at 1865 n.84
("As a matter of common sense, the law's moral credibility is not needed to tell a
person that murder, rape, and robbery is wrong."); 2 JA..llviES FITZJAMES STEPHEN,
A HlSTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883) ("No one in this country
regards, murder, rape, arson, robbery, theft, or the like, with any feeling but
detestation. I do not think it admits of any doubt that law and morals
powerfully support and greatly intensify each other in this matter.").
317. Stuntz, supra note 305, at 1871 ("The mass of the population avoids
seriously bad behavior not because they know it can be found in the codes, but
because they know the behavior is thought to be seriously bad.").
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legitimacy operates best in only regulatory domains in which state
objectives might be achieved equally or nearly as well through civil
law or other means. 318
The question comes down to which concept ultimately provides
a better screen. For a number of reasons, we believe that moral
credibility should be expected to more effectively motivate optimal
deference. First, moral credibility entails a concrete assessment of
the substantive law or enforcement effort at hand. Legitimacy, by
contrast, entails institutional analyses that operate at higher levels
of abstraction. To produce deference, then, legitimacy is mediated
by a cognitive move: the prospective offender must contemplate
illegal conduct, then consider what she thinks of the set of
procedures used to enforce it, and then decide whether to engage in
the forbidden conduct based on her feelings-not toward the law
itself-but toward the system that prescribes it.
For moral
credibility to produce deference, the prospective offender need only
contemplate the i11egal conduct and then consider what she thinks of
that conduct. The questions are discrete and coherent: Should I
comply with this law? Is this law morally justified? Should I
cooperate with this prosecution?
Is this prosecution morally
justified? We expect that an individual is likelier to refrain from
behavior that she finds immoral than from behavior that she deems
neither right nor wrong but that just so happens to be proscribed by
legitimate authority.319
As Sarah Lawsky has observed:
"[A]ssessments of distributive justice might lead to compliance (or
noncompliance) directly, without being mediated by an increased
belief in legitimacy."320 Indeed, studies have shown that "whereas
assessments of procedural justice tend to influence views and
beliefs ... assessments of distributive justice tend to influence
behavior ."321
Second, moral judgments are innately comprehensible. We are
all social beings with moral compasses that we instinctively
consult.322
We require no auxiliary understanding to access
318. Indeed, the amorality of many regulatory offenses invites the first-order
question of whether the underlying malum prohibitum conduct should be
criminalized in the first instance. LWJ, supra note 281, at 186-95.
319. See Linda Skitka, Christopher Bauman & Brad Lytle, The Limits of
Legitimacy: Morality as a Constraint on Deference to Authority, Presentation to
22nd Ann. IACM Conf. (.June 15, 2009) (transcript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=1493520.
But cf. Jaime
Napier & Tom. R. Tyler, Does Moral Conviction Really Override Concerns About
Procedural Justice? A Reexamination of the Value Protection Model, 21 Soc.
JUST. RES. 509, 513 (2008) Craising conceptual and empirical concerns with
Skitka's research).
320. Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited
Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 184 (2008).
321. Id.
322. Nadler, supra note 210; Robinson & Darley, Intuitions of Justice, supra
note 3, at 4.
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perceptions of just deserts. But we must achieve a certain level of
socialization for legitimacy to do its work. We must grasp the
objectives, structure, and methods of a justice system and the
implications of its procedural practices and strategic choices. For
this reason, perceptions of moral credibility are not just easier to
tap, they are likelier to be right. Fewer external variables cloud our
moral valuations. By contrast, perceptions of legitimacy may fail to
reflect reality in fact because these perceptions may be based on
incomplete or inaccurate information about supplementary matters
of enforcement and adjudication. Indeed, the fact that perceptions
of procedural fairness rely on more than intuition may explain the
somewhat greater dissensus that we think we see on questions of
procedural as opposed to distributive justice.323
Third, legitimacy is an umbrella concept that covers everything
from discourteous to discriminatory behavior. And even if we lack a
comprehensive rank ordering of legitimacy criteria, it simply stands
to reason that mere rudeness is less likely to undermine deference
than perceived immorality.
Fourth, perceptions of procedural fairness are more likely to be
socially constructed than perceptions of substantive justice.
Therefore, the corrupt state may more easily manipulate the
legitimacy project to serve its bad ends, as we detail below.
Thus, we land in a somewhat different place than Tyler and
Darley. They emphasized legitimacy over moral credibility, arguing
that perceptions of procedural fairness are superior because they are
more global and thus have the potential to provide legal authorities
with broad discretionary power. Legitimacy provides greater and
more reliable authority to legal officials than does morality, because
legal officials have discretionary authority to decide what is
appropriate. Within the scope of their prescribed roles, the police
and courts make decisions, and citizens believe that they ought to
obey those decisions. Because legitimacy invests authorities with
discretionary authority, it is a more flexible form of social value
upon which to base the operation of the legal system. "With
morality, the discretion rests with citizens, who decide whether or
not the law corresponds to their moral values."324
Moral credibility, by contrast, asks only the narrow question of
what the public thinks of a particular law (or at most a particular
323. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 35, at 1892; see also supra notes 29,
54, 75-92 and accompanying text (exploring dissensus over the legitimacy of
certain procedures). But, of course, this is an empirical clai.m that demands
further study.
324. Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 723; see also TYLER, WPOL, supra note
1, at 4 ("Although both morality and legitimacy are normative, they are not
identical. Leaders are especially interested in having legitimacy in the eyes of
their followers, because legitimacy most effectively provides them with
discretionary authority that they can use in governing."); supra notes 10-14 and
accompanying text.
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application of a particular law) and thereby provides less free space
for unconstrained decision making. In short, it provides only a oneoff check.
But where Tyler and Darley saw a detriment to the moralcredibility project, we see its chief virtue. Tyler and Darley may be
right that perceptions of legitimacy provide authorities with leeway
to make unpopular decisions that are, nevertheless, correct. 325 But
the point presupposes that the decisions are, in fact, correct. What
if their decisions are incorrect or, worse still, corrupt? As indicated,
a false perception of legitimacy may motivate unwarranted
deference, and we ought not to want the public to blindly acquiesce
to governmental conduct simply because the state has established
an ersatz reserve of good will or trust. Bad results may come to pass
when the public no longer makes or acts upon specific judgments as
to the appropriateness of discrete governmental action.
To put a finer point on it, we might imagine two systems. First,
in a legitimate system that has no reputation for moral credibility,
people will obey the law uncritically because legal authorities ought
to be obeyed, leaving unanalyzed the question of whether the law is
itself normatively defensible law. Because police and prosecutors
have vested interests in cultivating discretionary power, it is
unsurprising that legal authorities should favor such a system.3 2 6
But should the rest of us? Not if the best interests of legal
authorities fail to align with the public interest. Second, in a
morally credible system that has no reputation for legitimacy,
people will be indifferent to legal authorities but will behave morally
because it is right to behave morally.
Significantly, in such
circumstances, the public will be forever checking and rechecking
legal measures, and may choose to defy the state should it break
loose from its normative moorings. It is no flaw that, as Tyler
accurately observed, "Morality can lead to compliance with laws, but
it can also work against it."327 Rather, the individual may (and
typically should) feel compelled to deviate from even the legitimate
system that tries to implement and enforce an isolated unjust or
immoral liability or punishment rule. We should want the system to
cultivate deference for its morally laden directives. We may even
want the system to cultivate deference for its amoral or morally
ambiguous directives. But we should not want the system to
cultivate deference for its immoral directives.

325. Tyler & Darley, supra note 1, at 723 ("The legitimacy of authorities is
an especially promising basis for the rule of law, because research suggests that
it is not linked to agreement with the decisions made by legal
authorities .... [L]egal authorities ... are required to make unpopular
decisions, which may deliver unfavorable outcomes.").
326. TYLER, WPOL, supra note 1, at 4.
327. Id. (discussing resistance and acquiescence to the Vietnam conflict); see
supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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In sum, we think that, descriptively, moral intuitions pack more
punch, and, normatively, this is as it should be.328
CONCLUSION

A growing literature on procedural fairness suggests that there
is practical value in enhancing a criminal justice system's
"legitimacy" with the community. A separate literature suggests
that there is practical value in enhancing the system's "moral
credibility" with the community it governs by distributing criminal
liability and punishment according to principles that track the
community's shared intuitions of justice. In this Article, we have
examined the shared aims and the similarities in the operation and
effect of these two criminal justice dynamics as well as their
occasional differences in effect and their potential for conflict.
Among other things, we have concluded that the normative
influences of the two dynamics are indeed similar, and that they
may be mutually reinforcing. On the other hand, the extent of our
knowledge about the two dynamics is different.
While the
"legitimacy" dynamic is the better known, and is more frequently
used as a justification by scholars, we know less about what
practices and procedures will produce legitimacy than we do about
what liability and punishment rules will produce moral credibility.
Similarly, at present, there is less empirical support for the claimed
beneficial practical effects of legitimacy in producing deference and
compliance than there is for moral credibility doing the same.
While the benefits of pe1·ceived legitimacy and moral credibility
go beyond the deontological to include the practical benefits of
advancing effective crime control, it is also true that plausible and
good-faith arguments, generally utilitarian in nature, can be made
in support of practices, procedures, or rules that are perceived as
unfair or unjust. However, we argue that a system should deviate
from the community's notions of fairness and justice only when:

first, that deviation achieves a goal that cannot be achieved through
nondeviation means; and, second, the crime-control benefits of the
deviation outweigh the crime-control costs inherent in undermining
the system's legitimacy and moral credibility.
Finally, we have shown that sometimes there is even tension
between the dynamics of legitimacy and moral credibility, as with
such doctrines as double jeopardy, the exclusionary rule, speedy
trial, and the legality principle. While the effect of moral credibility
in producing cooperation and deference may be greater than that of
legitimacy, the choice between the two is more complex, commonly
dependent upon context. Sometimes, legitimacy is to be prioritized.
More often, we think moral credibility is the superior value.
Happily, it is typically the case that legitimacy and moral credibility
328. See Skitka et al., supra note 313.
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work together to support one another in harnessing the powerful
forces of social and normative influence in gaining deference and
compliance.
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